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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to investigate change leadership as it was 
experienced by incumbent leaders in a multinational, Fortune 100 company. Leaders 
were faced with an unrelenting and turbulent period of destabilizing conditions in their 
company, including significant changes in technologies, competition, economic 
distress, and continued downsizing of the employee population. The turbulence forced 
the leaders to develop a new mindset about their organization in order to cope with the 
changes. I was particularly interested in the interpersonal and intrapersonal behaviors 
of seven upper-echelon leaders during the corporate transformation.
The approach was grounded theory. Data were analyzed for possible themes, 
and models were built and then juxtaposed with the literature for authenticity.
Findings show that the executives experienced a series o f stages during the turbulence: 
denial, determination, disequilibrium, and disengagement. There were specific triggers 
to each phase of the process: latitude diminished, loyalty to key principles in the 
organization were removed, and continuity and stability of the organization were 
compromised. New terms and definitions for change leadership are offered (e.g., 
latitude, loyalty, continuity).
The study is important for two reasons. First, it adds to the qualitative research 
on change leadership theory by introducing new models and definitions not considered
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in the current body of literature. Second, corporate transformations and large-scale 
change initiatives continue to be a requirement for survival for many companies 
undergoing significant and traumatic change, and yet the transformative results have 
been difficult to achieve. This study assists change agents who are helping 
organizations through the implementation of large-scale change initiatives by 
providing an analytical model that details specific triggers of engagement that are 
critical for success.
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PREFACE
In preparation for the writing of this dissertation and to situate myself in the 
study, I read my personal journals and diaries written throughout my career. These 
readings helped me realize that I have been a student of leadership and culture change 
for at least 20 years, starting with my early years in public education and continuing 
into my work in corporate America. I also recognize that it is only because of my 
unique experiences and exposures throughout my career that the leaders in this study 
trusted me and provided me insight into the interpersonal and intrapersonal 
interactions which occurred. They knew I had likely experienced many of the same 
changes. Although I started my career in education, this preface focuses only on my 
career progression and exposures during my corporate life from the beginning, I held 
progressively complex roles. I started as a manager of a literacy program which was 
designed to build a basic skills school for manufacturing personnel. The workforce at 
the time could not compete due to the inability to read new computer specifications, 
work in problem-solving teams, or interpret spreadsheets. The challenge was to help 
1,500 factory workers from three divisions and three shifts pass a basic battery of 
literacy tests. I was provided nine classrooms but no textbooks, curriculum, or 
instructors. The curriculum and delivery methodology was to be designed from the 
ground up. Designing included developing workplace literacy materials, instituting a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
xii
computer lab, hiring my own instructors, and accelerating the learning of the students 
as much as possible.
Our initial efforts were stellar. Many early achievers passed the test, but then 
the pass rate slowed down as we began working with the less English-proficient 
population.
Because the company believed in data-driven decisions, we decided to analyze 
how we could accelerate the learning of the remaining students. I was asked to lead a 
problem-solving team using the management tools from the quality movement, so 
widespread in corporate America at the time. This assignment involved developing a 
team from cross-functional departments that could contribute toward solving the 
problem. We used statistical process control methods to pilot different methodologies 
and won the problem-solving competition that showcased the best problem-solving 
teams worldwide in the company.
It was my early induction into corporate life. I developed an appreciation for 
the rigor and discipline required for proposals. I also recognized that worldwide teams 
were just as talented and competitive as any of the US teams and hungry to be on an 
equal footing within the company.
My leadership in this first team provided me opportunities to lead other teams 
to propose ways to do things with faster productivity, at lower costs, while at the same 
time retaining high quality. I quickly found myself comfortable using all the cliche- 
type language that was such a part of the company—words used to describe quality 
and performance measurement—words like zero defects, systems thinking, response
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time, product development half-time, bottlenecks, alignment, and participatory 
management processes. Other people-focused words were common as well: decrease 
turnover, retain talent, increase employee satisfaction, and mobilize the troops. 
Organizational goals included things like reduce cycle time, manage the competitive 
landscape, increase market share, and continue customer focus.
In those early days, I was the Manager of Professional Development, and I 
sourced, developed, or delivered programs in topical areas such as motivation theory, 
quality improvement, supply chain management, leadership development, and 
management effectiveness skills. Even then, I recognized that these programs were 
only effective as reminders for proper behavior of leaders. To really change the 
behavior and perspective of leaders, many other components of the leaders' lives also 
had to be changed, including how they were compensated, how their jobs were 
scoped, and how they were provided with appropriate resources.
My next role was to develop a strategy and process to combine decentralized 
divisions to work together to determine a worldwide delivery strategy for training 
programs. This job afforded me the opportunity to work with other parts of the 
company, and I developed friendships with colleagues from Singapore, Latin America, 
Europe, Puerto Rico, and several states in the US. We defined and refined the 
processes for design, development, and launching of training products. These 
processes linked training organizations across all the business regions, reduced the 
cost, and enhanced the quality of training delivery worldwide.
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To accomplish our goals, our teams were taught by the best re-engineering 
gurus at the time, the thought leader in the total quality movement. I learned about 
change management techniques, such as measuring the degree required for the change; 
looking at processes, policies, and procedures related to the change; and developing 
effective change communication techniques to help teams adapt to new situations. Re­
engineering became so prevalent that employees were, in essence, identifying 
synergies and redundancies in their own organization that could ultimately affect their 
long-term employment.
The change literature contrasts the difference between macro and micro 
changes. Typically, macro changes are defined as those that are corporate-wide, 
whereas micro changes are at the individual employee level. From my experiences I 
learned it is not that simple. Changes made in one manufacturing area in Tianjin, 
China, for instance, can easily affect a factory in California. As a leader, I could not 
ignore these global influences when talking with my staff members, because they were 
witnessing some of the same outcomes. I found that the talking points, developed by 
the organizational development department, based on change management 
communication techniques, seemed formulaic and too business-focused. I recognized 
that to be considered an authentic leader of my team would require me to be much 
more transparent.
My next career provided insight into cultural transformation in organization 
through consulting opportunities. Specifically, I learned how the centralization of 
business units affects both leaders and workers alike. My new role had two parts: (a)
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to sell consulting services to preferred suppliers and strategic customers at the senior 
executive level, and (b) to source relevant executive speakers for the companies we 
served. Companies I consulted for at the time included GE Capital, Ford Motor 
Company, Eastman Kodak, Budweiser, and Caterpillar. Working with some of the 
most well-known business schools, I sourced well-known thought leaders for the 
companies we served—schools like the Harvard Business School, the Kellogg School 
of Business of Northwestern University, the Amos Tuck School of Business of 
Dartmouth, the Stanford Graduate School of Business, and the University of Michigan 
Business School. Even to this day, I marvel at how many opportunities I have had to 
work with some of the best and brightest authors in the field. In doing the research for 
this dissertation, I recognized that I had attended seminars, and in some cases 
negotiated, with the very authors we used back in those early years.
My next opportunity provided much insight regarding management of staff. As 
the Manager of Operations my duties included both personnel management and cost 
management. We provided training for a region in the company; at one time we had 
over 300 consultants that we hired and evaluated for the training courses for our 
constituents. During those years our training costs, which were charged back to the 
company, increased from $9 million to $11.5 million, because the company believed 
firmly in the value of developing their people and our internal customers also believed 
in the value of the programs we provided. I developed a philosophy. For an 
organization to withstand change, individuals must first possess the tools and 
techniques necessary to make them productive and successful in their roles.
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What about leadership experience in running a business during turbulence? At 
this point, the previous manager of the Central Region took a rotational assignment in 
Malaysia, and later in Japan, and I was soon promoted to be the new director of a large 
US training region, which included 27,000 employees at the time. My staff included 
70 people, and my annual budget was $14 million.
The technology industry was booming. Competition from overseas was 
growing, putting pressure on our organization. We were losing market share to other 
companies that were designing products at a considerably lower cost. Because training 
was a support group for the business units, training was considered overhead that 
could be cut during difficult times. My department went from a dedicated group of 
approximately 1,100 people worldwide to 400, and more cuts appeared to be 
inevitable.
This downsizing had a huge impact on my own group. Reading over my 
performance review, written at the time, emphasized to me the terrific duress we were 
experiencing. Indicators included: we reduced software training costs by $765 
thousand per year; we shrank learning time in the classroom through developing 
strategy for e-leaming; eight decentralized training organizations were merged through 
a process of redesign which reduced operating costs by 30%; the product portfolio was 
consolidated and streamlined worldwide from 10,000 course titles to 2,500; and staff 
was held to 75% of full deployment level while delivering the full load of training 
with no loss of quality.
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Reading over it now, I vividly remember the pain and meaning of the 
transformation of those times. Many good employees were let go, not because of 
inferior performance, but because either the work had been made redundant (due to 
process redesign) or because there was no longer a need for so many full-time people 
when there were fewer requests for training. The impact on me was disorienting and I 
applied for a transfer. The new job gave me insight into organizational and leadership 
development. In the Organizational Development Department I held two consecutive 
roles. The first was to assist with the introduction of several new organization-wide 
programs: new performance management programs and new succession planning 
methods.
Both programs were necessary at the time. Due to continued downsizing, 
individuals within the company were highly competitive with one another. They 
positioned themselves for the next best job. Self-aggrandizing behaviors among 
colleagues, previously anomalies, were now relatively common. People took 
individual credit for work that a whole team had done. And there were signs of 
employee sabotage. A typical example was the subtle placing of a person's name at the 
bottom of a PowerPoint presentation, so that management would assume the person 
had come up with the concepts himself or herself. The performance management and 
succession management programs did not affect these behaviors. In fact, the programs 
seemed to exacerbate the behaviors. Worse, the downsizing of the company continued 
month by month and quarter by quarter. I recognized that even the most elegantly 
designed programs that were benchmarked against the best companies in the world
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would have little effect in the culture at the time. What was first required was the 
employees' belief in the sustainability of the company and their own career longevity 
with it.
My second and last role in the company was to be in charge of executive 
education for the officer level. Our programs usually included case studies focused at 
the apex of the organization, specifically learning about CEOs from companies that 
were considered successful at the time, for example, General Electric, Southwest 
Airlines, Intel, and Herman Miller. I recognized that the very language I had wondered 
about in my early years, while working in problem-solving teams, was the language 
that many of these speakers were using, but the language seemed disingenuous. Given 
the terrible conditions that the company was in, I was hoping to find leaders who had 
explored new dimensions of leadership and change. A new language was clearly 
required, rather than the imitative, already-baked words and theories that every other 
company had previously used. Unfortunately, the well-networked, powerful, and 
prestigious executives who attended the sessions liked hearing these speakers. The 
executives did not seem to agree with my own interpretation of the words, because the 
evaluation marks for my programs were consistently high. The speakers were 
espousing the same values that many in the room also held, which included running a 
lean, competitive, market-driven, and supposedly visionary company. I did not fit in 
the same way I once did. Or was it that the future looked increasingly unfamiliar?
I decided to move to another company, one vastly different from my previous 
organization. It had only 5,000 employees and had existed for only 18 years. Another
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major change was that the new environment was dominated by sales people, as 
opposed to engineers. Also, most employees were young, between the ages of 30 and 
35. In fact, when I first joined, I was probably in the top 2% age-wise of all the people 
there. Very few processes were in place. There was a short-term, execution focus in 
the company, and people were very cost-conscious. Because everyone had a sense that 
they shared in the success of the company, each person did his or her best to make the 
company successful. The culture was collegial, family-oriented, and as a result not 
inclusive of outsiders. I knew that to succeed, I needed to make some significant 
adjustments. I recognized that the old timers in the company, although friendly, were 
suspicious of some of the proposals I introduced. I learned to appreciate the 
importance of insuring that the culture was ready for change prior to the introduction 
of new initiatives.
Also, I was appointed as a board member for the International Nuclear Power 
Organization (INPO), the accrediting board for the nuclear industry. It reviews the 
efficacy of learning and development programs and identifies ways that leaders can 
affect change to make the learning more effective. As a board member I learned that 
although there is a friendly formality between company leaders and board members, 
there remains the vestige of ultimate authority of the board that I had never fully 
appreciated up until this point.
What has been fascinating in all of these roles is that I continue to recognize 
that, in spite of the differences in size, focus, and age of a company, every
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organization and leadership group is exhibiting some of the same behaviors and 
opportunities for improvement required to respond to turbulent change.
In summary, my collective experiences in corporate life provided me with 
first-hand knowledge of change leadership. With that, I embarked on a scholarly 
examination of leadership. This research provided a means to study change in full 
measure, including a new set of terms and definitions. My interest in the scholarship 
grew. I looked at familiar phenomena in new ways. I learned how to make meaning of 
these critical concepts.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The literature on change leadership implies that leaders have a responsibility to 
steer an organization through a course of change by providing direction and support 
throughout the process. Leaders are exhorted to exemplify change leadership 
behaviors (such as the ability to deal with ambiguity), set an appropriate vision, and 
communicate effectively in a way that will assist followers to understand and follow 
the new direction of the change. The assumption here is that some of the literature on 
change leadership requires a greater emphasis on contextual analysis.
As I have observed the complexity of change, I recognize many factors that 
mitigate the new change occurring as intended. Such factors include an increasingly 
unstable marketplace, competition in the leadership ranks, cynicism in the employee 
rank and file, and disillusionment with shareholders and board members who are 
voting daily with their pocketbooks as the market changes. In other words, although 
change leadership is required, it is important to consider how it is accomplished during 
times of corporate turbulence, when aspirations of leaders and shareholders are high, 
but expectations from management and em ployees are often low.
When the investigation started, the purpose was to better understand the 
interpersonal and intrapersonal behavior of upper-echelon leaders. The purpose 
evolved into the meaning of turbulent change to these leaders. The process of topic
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2evolution is explained in detail in the methodology chapter. This is a contextual 
analysis o f a highly successful, technological business that went from high growth in 
the middle 1990s to a period of significant downturns in revenue and margin in the 
early 2000s. The premise of the study was the adage that either you are the master of 
change, or you are its servant (Drucker, 1995). My assumption was that change could 
be managed, in spite of turbulence, and that the executives I planned to interview 
could assist me in learning how that is accomplished.
The setting for this research was a Fortune 100, multinational company in the 
Midwest, which I have named Compass, to protect the anonymity of the subjects. The 
story begins when the company was a leader in market share, with an excellent 
reputation for innovation, a solid brand as a high-quality technological company, a 
“Darling of Wall Street,” a leader in people development, and a premier employer. 
The story continues to a time when that same company was maligned as too 
bureaucratic, unprofitable, and out of touch with reality. The ongoing story is how the 
leaders dealt with the unexpected downturn in the business, sought to gain personal 
assurance that the business was going in the right direction, and dealt with superiors, 
fellow leaders, and constituents to address daunting obstacles.
Study Genesis
My interest in the subject of change during turbulent times is based on both a 
personal and a scholarly perspective. As outlined in the preface, I experienced the
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3sudden downturn in the business as a 12-year employee of Compass. Up to that point, 
working at Compass was like living in Camelot. Although it rained from time to time, 
due to economic cycles in the business, leaders usually were perceived as making the 
right decisions to move the business forward. During the early 2000s, however, all the 
decisions that were made seemed to fall short of turning the business around. A 
corporate transformation of the company was believed to be necessary. New leaders 
were installed who had not been part of Compass previously. They brought with 
themselves a new set of values, beliefs, strategies, and approaches that were 
significantly different from what executives in the business had experienced up to that 
time.
I experienced the change and watched the behavior of my fellow leaders and 
employees during the change process. As I watched the behaviors o f the executives at 
Compass, who were two or three levels above my rank, I became interested in 
knowing whether they were dealing with the turmoil in the same manner as I was. In 
talking with them about the continued turbulence, I was amazed by how insightful 
they were about the changes, how much they still cared about the company, and how 
much alike our experiences had been. A common experience had been a sense of 
powerlessness to enact needed changes, because the business climate was 
continuously changing—in spite of our best efforts. It was as though we were all in a 
leaky boat together, industriously plugging holes and scooping out water, but new 
holes would appear unexpectedly and we continued to sink further.
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4From a scholarly viewpoint, I was aware of all the major change theorists. In 
the business context, some of the theories just did not seem to apply or were 
incomplete. These included Fiedler and colleagues (Fiedler 1967, 1971; Fiedler & 
Chemers, 1974; Fiedler, & Garcia, 1987); Hersey and colleagues (Hersey, Blanchard 
& Johnson, 1977, 1996); Drucker (Drucker, 1969, 1995, 1998; Eisner, 1998); 
Blanchard and colleagues (Blanchard & Bowles, 1990; Blanchard, Edington & 
Blanchard, 1990); Conner (1995); Kotter (1995; 1996; 2002; Kotter & Heskett, 1992); 
and Peters and colleagues (Peters, 1987; Peters & Austin, 1985; Peters & Waterman, 
1982). All authors were important figures in either the scholarly world or as best­
selling authors, with significant contributions to notions of change. In fact, I had 
helped bring some of these scholars into sessions with our executives during these 
times to assist them in their change efforts. These theorists discussed change 
management strategies, and the roles leaders play during change, but they discussed 
change as if it was a discrete event. Changes we were facing were not incremental 
changes; they were changes that affected every aspect of our company: the leaders, the 
employees, and the community we served. What was required was an ongoing process 
to significantly change the very fabric of the company. I believe change leadership 
cannot be interpreted without reference to the context.
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5Importance of Study
This study is important for two reasons. The amount of significant, often 
traumatic, change in organizations has grown tremendously over the last few decades 
(Kotter, 1996). We are living in a time of unprecedented change (Drucker, 1995), and 
all organizations must adapt to it. The competitive environment is changing rapidly 
due to globalization, emerging technologies, degradation of workforce preparedness, 
and financial pressures that are forcing massive cost-cutting and downsizing (Sullivan 
& Harper, 1997). Fully two thirds of the Fortune 100—and probably an equally 
significant proportion of small and mid-size companies—claim to be in the midst of 
some kind of revamping or major change that is aimed at the behaviors and skills of 
hundreds or thousands of people at all levels (Katzenbach, 1995).
Although global corporate transformation is a requirement for survival for 
many companies, the transformative results are not only mixed, but also difficult to 
achieve (Schoonover, 1968). As such, leaders recognize the need for transformation, 
because failure to succeed can lead to dissolution or disintegration of even the most 
prestigious or mammoth of organizations. In underscoring the importance of change, 
the risk of failure cannot be overly emphasized. Should they ignore, misjudge, or 
poorly execute imperative and substantial change initiatives or processes, private 
sector organizations, public entities, enterprises, and agencies can falter and disappear 
almost overnight.
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6The second reason that this study is important is that, despite a growing
interest in organizational transformation in industry, academia, and government,
organization theory remains relatively immature in this area, particularly as it relates
to understanding large, complex organizational transformations (Else, 2004). I suspect
that one of the reasons for the lack of many studies in this arena is access, because
executives are careful not to share too much detail out of loyalty to the company, as
well as fear of retribution from their fellow leaders should rumors get started. The
result is that operations of large corporations are hidden from the public and to those
on the inside. Moss-Kanter (1977) summarized the difficulty of studying corporations
in the following text:
Large corporations are often formidable and mysterious to people 
outside them, like giants that populate the earth, but can only be seen 
through the shadows. Yet informed participation in civic culture 
requires knowing more about how corporations operate or what people 
in them do than is contained in stereotypes of ambitious organization 
men or insensitive bureaucrats. Corporations are often equally 
mysterious to the people inside, whose views can be limited and 
parochial because they rarely get a sense of the whole. With the interest 
of villages that have never seen the rest of the world, insiders often ask 
an outsider who has just traveled to another part of the organization “Is 
it all like it is in my little comer? Is it the same other places?” Insiders 
too need the larger view in order to manage their situations, to 
understand the forces acting on them, to see options, and to consider 
alternatives, (p. 4)
Fortunately, when interviewing executives during this study, I was somewhat 
impressed with the candor, insight, and, indeed, how  alike their experiences were (to 
each others’ and to my own), despite differences in departments, functions, sectors, 
and rank. I believe that the reason these executives were willing to talk openly with 
me about their experiences was that I had credibility due to my own role as a Compass
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7leader, my understanding of the culture, the fact that I had no agenda, and the presence 
of my genuine interest to learn what these executives could offer to students who were 
interested in change theory. The insights that were provided led me to believe that this 
dissertation could truly contribute to the change literature because of its unique 
perspective on how executives manage through turbulence.
Statement of Purpose and Research Questions
The purpose of this study was to investigate change leadership as it occurs to 
incumbent leaders in a multinational company in turbulent times. Specifically, the 
study investigated how incumbent leaders who had held top positions in the company 
for a long period of time, provided rational accounts of the reality as they experienced 
corporate transformation. It should be noted that I did not define turbulence for my 
subjects; instead, each subject provided his or her own particular definition or time 
frame based on his/her experience of turbulence. All of the subjects interviewed 
indicated that although change was part of the fabric of Compass throughout the 
1990s, the most turbulent times were a result of the corporate transformation that 
occurred in the late 1990s and continues to the present. A definition of turbulence 
emerged: turbulence is the degree to which change causes ongoing, destabilizing 
conditions in the organization that require new mindsets for the individuals involved. 
The degree that I refer to here includes corporate survival itself.
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8Corporate transformation is defined by a radical change in corporate financial 
results, as well as paradigm shifts in the processes, structures, and behaviors of the 
corporation (Else, 2004). Transformation is an ongoing process that permeates the 
entire organization, and represents a sharp break with the past. This break is a major 
difference between transformation and simple reform. Whereas reform is an attempt to 
go down the same path more efficiently, transformation involves the development or 
discovery of entirely new paths (Garfield, 1991). In this context, the definition of 
transformation is much more difficult to establish from the literature, except that it, 
too, is an ongoing process or journey—one intended to result in a much more agile 
company, with fundamentally new ways of thinking (Else, 2004).
My fundamental research intention was to contribute a new way of thinking 
about change to the literature, by introducing new definitions and terms as well as 
discussing the components of change in a nonstatic manner. Definitions will be 
presented related to change, such as change leadership, loyalty, values congruence, 
and inclusion. Scholars who study change look for external, objective manifestations 
(such as power and influence), or situational aspects of change and specific change 
strategies required in particular cultures.
I was more interested in uncovering what happens behind the scenes.
Examples of my early questions included: What did executives do as decisions were 
being made that significantly changed their roles of their departments? What exactly 
were they doing to influence the CEO on behalf of their constituents in their 
departments? How did they argue for a different point of view if, in fact, they thought
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9that the direction that the company was taking was not the correct course? How did 
they manage the political side of change? For example, did they try to influence their 
fellow leaders in a specific way? How did they stay engaged through all the cultural 
shifts they were experiencing? For example, were they communicating the vision with 
an authentic belief that it was the right direction or were they merely following 
directions? Many of my interview questions are reflected in the interview protocol. I 
was primarily interested with how difficult decisions were made, the tough 
conversations executives had with fellow leaders, and what was happening in the 
trenches. Over time, the research evolved and the questions also changed. The 
research questions for this study were:
1. What is change leadership during turbulent times?
2. To what extent can a model of change leadership be developed?
3. Are there theoretical connections between disengagement and optimal 
components of change leadership during turbulent times?
4. To what extent can a theoretical model of engagement and/or 
disengagement during turbulence be developed?
The answers to these questions are provided in the ensuing chapters. It is 
important to note what this research is not about. It is not about the strategy of the 
company or whether the strategy was appropriate before or after the transformation. 
Nor is it about the nature and impact of the strategy on the employees themselves. 
Finally, it is not an examination of the traits that have made inspirational leaders great. 
Although I am interested in how the leaders dealt with their employees in the context
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of change, I did not explore the impact of the approach taken or try to find out if they 
had effective strategies for communicating and managing employees.
Thus, I offer a new way of investigating change leadership and new 
definitions. Table 1 contains the glossary of terms used in this study.





Turbulence The degree to which change causes an ongoing, 
destabilizing condition in the organization that requires 
new mindsets for the individuals involved.
Change Leadership The ability to instill in one’s self and one’s followers a 
sense of purpose by placing a premium on latitude, 
loyalty, and continuity.
Latitude The capacity to have decision authority that fits with the 
company direction so that decisions are not compromised.
Loyalty A rational and emotional commitment that drives 
discretionary effort and intent to stay based on inclusion 
and values congruence.
Continuity The degree to which an organization can be sustained and 
continued into the future based on its reputation and 
capability to deliver value.
Engagement An individual’s state of mind when he/she believes that 
staying with the organization is in his/her best self-interest 
and that going above and beyond will result in additional 
emotional, financial, and/or social gains.
Inclusion The extent to which an individual feels his/her input, 
opinion, or presence is sought out, valued, and accepted or 
acted upon by the organization.
Values Congruence The extent to which an individual perceives that the values 
of the organization match his/her personal values.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This literature review offers an analysis of theories and a development of the 
rationale for this study. The review reveals two distinct areas of research: (a) 
leadership theory, as it covers leaders’ behaviors, roles, and responsibilities; and (b) 
organizational theory, as it examines leaders in the context of the culture in which 
each leader resides. Because development of organizational leadership theories 
followed that of leadership theories (Else, 2004), I was also interested to learn how the 
organizational leadership theories matured.
Moreover, this analysis of the literature centers on leadership and change, 
beginning first with studies about leaders’ traits (largely written before the 1940s), on 
behaviors and styles (published between the 1940s and the 1960s), followed by 
contingency theories (late 1960s to the early 1980s), and finally on transformational 
leadership change theories published since the early 1980s (Bryman, 1992). 
Organizational theory deals primarily with three major areas of study: leadership 
competencies required for change, organizational culture and readiness for change, 
and leadership strategies for organizational transformation. This literature review will 
discuss the more prominent authors and theories during each time period and will 
illustrate both how the field of study matured as well as the problems with the 
associated theories.




Leadership traits theory centers upon the notion that leadership ability is likely 
innate; however, after the 1940s that conclusion was consistently found to be untrue. 
For instance, Hollander and Webb (1955) found that individuals who are recognized 
as preferred followers also tend to be recognized as highly preferred leaders. They 
question whether leaders were nominated into leadership positions on the basis of their 
being liked rather than their specific leadership abilities. In a landmark article, Stogdill 
(1948) assessed the strength of various findings on the basis of the number of studies 
that reported similar findings. He gave this body of literature the coup de grace by 
declaring that most of the literature was inconclusive or contradictory. However, two 
major conclusions were reached, based on positive results from at least 15 studies. As 
for characteristics, he found that a leader usually exceeds the average member of 
his/her group in areas of capacity: intelligence, alertness, verbal facility, originality 
and judgment; achievement: scholarship, athletic accomplishments; responsibility: 
dependability, initiative, persistence; social participation: cooperation, adaptability, 
humor; and socioeconomic status. His second finding was that the qualities, 
characteristics, and skills required for the leader are determined to a large extent by the 
demands of the situation in which he or she is to function as a leader.
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In spite of StogdilPs findings, searching for the most important trait that 
leaders exemplify in periods of change continues to be a subject of interest. Even as 
late as the 1980s, Jennings (1982) concluded that after 50 years of study, authors in the 
field had failed to produce one personality trait or set of qualities that could be used to 
discriminate leaders and nonleaders. This is not to say that certain leadership traits 
may not be important. The key is that there were no set of traits and/or competencies 
that have been identified to be predictive traits for leadership success.
Behavior Theory
Behavior theorists focus on a leader’s effectiveness in gaining commitment 
from followers (Bryman, 1992). To study behavior, theorists use empirical 
approaches, such as critical incidents reviews, observations, or leaders’ own behavior 
descriptions. Flanagan (1949) used a critical incident method to consider effective 
leadership performance. He classified over 3,000 incidents of effective and ineffective 
behavior of U.S. Air Force officers and placed them into six categories: handling 
administrative details, supervising personnel, planning and directing action, 
acceptance of organizational responsibility, acceptance of personal responsibility, and 
proficiency in military occupational specialty.
Lewin, Lippitt, and White (1960) used observations of elementary school boys 
as the basis of a landmark study that they conducted. The researchers formed a number 
of sponsored clubs among adult male graduate students in social psychology. Each
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leader was trained to behave toward the boys in his group in one of three leadership 
styles: authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire. The study found that groups with 
democratic leaders were the most satisfied and functioned in the most orderly and 
positive manner. On the other hand, autocratically led groups spent more time in 
productive work activity than did other groups, but only when the leader was present. 
However, all measures of productivity in the studies by Lewin and his associates refer 
to process variables, such as work-related conversations, rather than actually 
measuring how productivity was assessed (Lippitt & White, 1958).
McGregor (1960), who is one of the most widely cited behavioral theorists, 
describes two types of leaders: Theory X and Theory Y. Micromanagers who 
command and control are known as Theory X leaders. Theory Y leaders believe that 
people (a) deserve to be treated with dignity and respect, (b) are honest, and (c) can be 
trusted.
Mitzberg (1973) presented a tool for identifying ten managerial roles 
categorized by interpersonal behavior, information-processing behavior, and decision 
making. This approach examined the actions of a leader within an organization and 
recognized that the followers can also influence the leader’s behavior.
Research subsequent to Mitzberg’s has focused on leaders’ profiles in an effort 
to evaluate success profiles across leadership groups (Arad, Hanson, & Schneider, 
1997; Bensimon, Neumann, & Bimbaum, 1989). Even with all of these studies, 
behavioral theorists have not reached agreement on Mitzberg’s categories in order to 
be able to measure the value of these theories (Bensimon et al., 1989).
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House (1971) developed a number of hypotheses about the characteristics and 
behaviors of charismatic leaders. He tested the effect charismatic leaders had on their 
followers. The effects included: (a) followers trusted the truthfulness of the leader’s 
beliefs; (b) followers’ beliefs were similar to the leader’s beliefs; (c) followers had 
unquestioning acceptance of the leader and a willingness to obey the direction the 
leader provided; (d) followers had an emotional involvement in the leader’s concerns; 
and finally, (e) followers felt an affection for the leader (Bryman, 1992).
The limitations of descriptions of leader behavior include the following. First, 
a leader who is liked tends to be rated higher on surveys than one who is not liked. 
Thus, it is difficult to know whether the leader’s popularity influences the members of 
the group more than the leader’s specific behaviors (Fiedler, 1971). The second 
limitation focuses on the followers themselves rather than the leader. If members of a 
group like a decisive, structuring leader, they may assign a higher score to the leader 
that provides direction rather than one who does not. Therefore, the same leader may 
have high scores with one group of followers, but low scores with another group, 
based on the mix of personalities of the group members. The third concern is around 
the notion of leadership effectiveness. The behavioral approach assumes that there is 
one best method for obtaining top performance of the group, but there has been no 
behavior that has proven to be conclusive (Fiedler & Garcia, 1987).
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Contingency theories propose that the effectiveness of a leadership style 
depends on the situation, which means that a particular style or pattern of behavior 
will be effective in some circumstances but not in others. Contingency theorists 
explicitly draw attention to the notion that there is no universally appropriate style of 
leadership, because certain styles may have an impact in one situation but not in 
another (Bryman, 1992).
Fiedler (1971) is best known for introducing the situational approach to 
leadership studies. He believed that much of the literature in the area of managerial 
effectiveness had taken a one-sided view, stressing one aspect of the person, situation, 
or process at the expense of others. He offered a theory of leadership and managerial 
effectiveness that sought to integrate person, process, and situation.
Fiedler began with Lewin’s (Lewin, 1935; Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1960) 
well-known formula, B = /  (P, E), which stated that behavior (B) is a function of 
personality (P) and the environment (E). Fiedler and his colleagues (Fiedler & 
Chemers, 1974) asked what particular aspects of the environment interacted with 
personality in affecting behavior. These researchers believed that the concept of 
leadership effectiveness is the degree of success with which a group performs the 
primary assigned task (Fiedler & Garcia, 1987). The researchers were interested in 
determining what types of leaders perform well in different types of situations, what 
the critical differences in the situations were that helped predict leadership
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effectiveness, and what was the relationship of power and influence of the leader on 
the situation.
The contingency model states that the effectiveness of a leader or group 
depends (or is contingent) on the leader’s need structure (specifically, whether the 
leader is primarily motivated to seek task accomplishment or to seek satisfaction of 
interpersonal needs), the leader’s situational control (i.e., the leader’s confidence that 
the task will be accomplished), and the interaction between the leader’s need structure 
and situational controls. Thus, three components were established in Fiedler’s and his 
colleagues’ framework: Task Structure, Leader-Member Relations, and Position 
Power (Fiedler & Chemers, 1974).
Task structure is the degree to which the task requirements are spelled out. 
Tasks were rated according to three dimensions: (a) goal clarity, the degree to which 
the requirements of the job are clearly stated or known to people performing the job;
(b) goal-path multiplicity, the degree to which the problems encountered in the job can 
be solved in a variety of procedures; and decision verifiability; and (c) the degree to 
which the correctness of the solutions or decisions typically encountered in a job can 
generally be demonstrated by appealing to an authoritarian source (Fiedler, 1967).
Leader-member relationships are based primarily on the leader’s need structure 
and situational controls. Task-motivated leaders tend to perform best in situations in 
which they have high control, as well as in those in which their control is low. 
Relationship-motivated leaders perform best in moderately controlled situations 
(Fiedler & Garcia, 1987).
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Position Power is the degree to which the leader has been given the right to 
direct, evaluate, and reward or punish those he/she is asked to supervise. Three aspects 
of the situation were considered to be the most important in determining the leader’s 
control and influence. These were: (a) whether the leader’s group atmosphere score or 
the sociometric preference for the leader is high or low; (b) whether the task is 
relatively structured or unstructured; (c) and whether the position power is relatively 
high or low.
Fieldler’s Contingency Model was an important contribution in the study of 
leadership effectiveness, because it considered the context in which the leader resided. 
Situational leadership theories (Blanchard & Bowles, 1990; Blanchard et al., 1990; 
Hersey et al., 1996), which proliferated in the early 1990s, were based on Fiedler’s 
work and formed the basis for discussions related to high-performing teams. For 
example, The Situational Leadership Theory, developed by Hersey, Blanchard, and 
Johnson (1977), relates appropriate behavior by leaders to the maturity of the 
followers, motivation to achieve, willingness to take responsibility, and education and 
experience to enhance performance in teams (Valencia, 2004).
The problem with this line of research as it pertains to turbulent change is that 
first, situational favorableness, leadership power and influence, and required tasks 
change continuously, thus making it difficult to assess which of the elements are most 
pertinent to bring about change or are mitigating performance improvement. Second, 
the cultural aspects of the organization need to be taken into consideration rather than 
principally focusing on the task or specific situation. A third problem with the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
20
literature is that the theory is often used as a measure of the leader-follower 
relationship, with the results based primarily on internal leadership performance 
reviews and some group performance, rather than on what leaders do during major 
paradigm shifts of corporate change.
Transformational Leadership Theory
Literature relevant to transformational leadership often is considered to have 
begun with the work of Bums, who conceptualized transformational leadership theory 
in his 1978 book Leadership. He distinguished between the transactional (ordinary) 
leader and the transformational (extraordinary) leader. Bums defined the 
transformational leader by his/her ability to motivate followers beyond normal 
expectations. Transformational leaders achieve organizational growth by focusing on 
followers’ attention on the importance of the organizational vision and by motivating 
followers to put the needs of the organization before the needs of the individual. Bums 
hypothesized that transformational leaders transform their followers by engaging them 
in a relationship of mutual leadership, techniques whereby followers become leaders 
as well (Bums, 1978).
Bass (1988) built on the work of Bums and proposed a theory of 
transactional/transformational leadership which dominated the organizational 
development research in the 1990s and continues to be a theory of major study. The
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literature base dealing with his theoretical framework is important to consider. Bass 
divides leadership into three types: transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire.
Transformational leaders are known to have subordinates who report greater 
satisfaction, develop higher-performing work groups, and receive higher ratings of 
effectiveness and performance. Typically, these leaders inspire followers to do more 
than originally was expected by broadening and elevating the interest of followers in 
the group’s purpose and mission and by motivating followers to go beyond their self- 
interests. Transformational leaders integrate creative insight, influence, motivation, 
and individualized considerations of others to align organizational strategy into the 
culture of the organization.
Transactional leadership is founded on the idea that leader-follower relations 
are based on a series of exchanges or implicit bargains between leaders and followers. 
Followers receive certain valued outcomes (e.g., wages, prestige) when they act 
according to their leaders’ wishes. Transactional leaders are characterized by 
contingent reward systems and management-by-exception styles of leadership.
Laissez-faire leaders avoid both decision making and supervisory 
responsibility. This type of leader is inactive versus reactive or proactive. It is 
measured by the absence of leadership as opposed to measuring a particular leadership 
approach.
When Bass first conceptualized transactional and transformational leadership 
he included seven leadership factors, which he labeled charisma, inspirational, 
intellectual stimulation, individualized consideration, contingent reward, management-
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by-exception, and laissez-faire leadership (Bennis & Nanus, 1985). In later writings, 
Bass (1988) noted that although charismatic and inspirational leadership were unique 
constructs, they were often not empirically distinguishable, thus reducing his original 
multifactor model to six factors (Avolio, Bass, & Jung, 1999).
When measuring transformational leadership with Bass’s Multifactor 
Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) four factors, denoted as the 4 1’s (Bass & Avolio, 
1993), are assessed: idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual 
stimulation, and individualized consideration. When measuring transactional 
leadership, three factors are addressed: contingent reward (compensation for 
performing specific tasks and sales commission are typical examples), active 
management-by-exception (job standards are established and communicated and 
variances from those standards are used to critique performance), and passive 
management-by-exception (job standards are not communicated and performance 
variance critiques are after-the fact and accusatory).
The first problem with the literature is that Bass’s theoretical framework is 
designed as a continuum between two elements: transformational and transactional 
leadership (Bass & Avolio, 1990; Bass & Stogdill, 1990; Bass, Waldman, Avolio, & 
Bebb, 1987). The theory makes distinctions between outstanding leaders 
(transformational), average managers (transactional), and poor performers in 
management jobs (laissez-faire). Such distinctions are not very insightful when one is 
trying to identify leadership characteristics that are important for executive leaders 
involved in complex organizational change. A second criticism of the literature is that
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the goal of expecting leaders to adopt a transformational leadership style may not be 
appropriate during times of corporate upheaval. It may well be that the leader who 
provides structure, stability, and predictability (such as the transactional leader) is 
important during the early evolution of the new structure and strategy.
Finally, the literature approaches the question theoretically and in a fragmented 
way. When describing leadership competencies, such as creating visions and 
leadership elements necessary for the alignment of culture, theorists generally ignore 
the short-term pressure issues that leaders face.
Transformational Change Theory
The literature in the area of leadership role models in the midst of change has 
received much attention because of best-selling books by both Tom Peters (Peters, 
1987; Peters & Austin, 1985; Peters & Waterman, 1982) and John Kotter (Kotter,
1995, 1996, 2002; Kotter & Heskett, 1992).
Peters, a well-known author and commentator on the management scene, uses 
an “excellence model,” which describes how leaders are more effective when they 
possess expertise, skills, and knowledge that followers respect and regard as 
important. Throughout the 1990s, a well-known approach in some leadership 
programs was the Hewlett-Packard philosophy of Management by Wandering Around 
(MBWA), made famous in the book In Search o f Excellence (Peters & Waterman, 
1982). The book suggests that leaders should wander around and catch people doing
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things right. Peters was emphasizing Theory Y Management styles, which had been 
discussed earlier in McGregor’s work (1960). Peter’s Excellence Model also had a 
role in the Quality Movement. “Quality is above all, about care, people, passion, 
consistency, eyeball contact and gut reaction” (Peters & Waterman, 1982, p. 90).
Kotter (1996, 2002; Kotter & Heskett, 1992) has been touted as the “foremost 
expert on business leadership” by the Harvard Business School Press (Kotter, 1996) 
and as such, requires mention in this review. Kotter’s 8-step vision of establishing a 
sense of urgency, building coalitions, communicating vision, etc. (1996) provides a 
formulaic way for business leaders to ensure that their constituents are aligned to the 
needed changes. His later book in 2002 provides real-life stories of how the eight 
strategies were utilized by specific people in specific firms, typically at the CEO level.
Several authors build stage models that are similar to those of Kotter and 
Peters in that the later-stage models typically involve visioning, communicating, and 
evaluating the change. For example, there is a 6-stage model that involves visioning, 
communicating, generating new organizational opportunities, influencing 
stakeholders, maintaining motivation, and staying the course (Kent, Johnson, & 
Graber, 1996). Another 6-stage model proposes that implementing discontinuous 
change is important to do in order to transform organizations. This involves: (a) 
diagnosis, that is, communicating why the change is needed; (b) recruiting change 
agents and anticipating resistance; (c) communicating to the entire organization; (d) 
consolidation and refinement; (e) evaluation, such as establishing lessons learned and 
measuring success; and (f) sustaining, which involves reflection and the identification
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of smaller change projects (Nadler, Shaw, & Walton, 1995). Bennis provides a 4-stage 
model for transformational leadership change which includes: (a) attention through a 
vision, that is having a clear agenda and being oriented toward results; (b) achieving 
meaning through communication (through the use of metaphors, images, and models);
(c) gaining trust through positioning, which involves demonstrating accountability and 
predictability; and (d) gaining recognition or attention through positive self-regard 
(Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Bennis & Townsend, 1995). All of these stage theories 
discuss how transformational leaders involve and commit followers to achieving the 
vision by inspiring greater involvement in the work and providing more self- 
fulfillment by increasing their emotional and intellectual preparation. By articulating 
the vision and imparting the rationale behind the decisions, the goals are accepted and 
the transformational leader gains trust and respect (Clark & Clark, 1996).
Notions of life-long learning, as it relates to leaders who role model change, 
were also discussed by Kotter (1995) and others. For example, Senge (1990, 1994), 
was able to put into “business speak” notions of lifelong learning that had been 
espoused by many of the adult learning theorists. These theorists included Brookfield 
(1993), Hake (1999), Knowles (1980), and Kuchinke (1999). Senge (1994) 
emphasized the impact of personal mastery, which not only would increase the 
individual leader’s own capability but also would improve the capabilities of the other 
people around them.
What a leader does to build systemic change is also a focus in the 
transformational leadership change theory literature. Kouzes and Posner (1993)
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maintain that “leadership is a relationship between constituents and leaders that is 
based on mutual needs and interests” (p. 11). The notion of mutuality is that both 
leader and follower have an interest in organizational success. The leader’s role is to 
be credible, honest, supportive (i.e., not self-serving), forward-looking, inspiring, and 
competent (Kouzes & Posner, 1993). Collins and Lazier (1992) propose that “the 
number one responsibility of a leader is to catalyze a clear and shared vision for the 
company and to secure commitment to and vigorous pursuit of that vision” (p. 4). The 
goal of the leader is to get followers to share the company’s vision by emphasizing the 
importance of communication by leaders through the use of vivid images to convey 
what the company is needing to do (Collins & Lazier, 1992). Nanus (1992) echoes this 
line of thinking by maintaining that the transformational leader creates and 
communicates a well-developed vision that galvanizes and exerts an influence on 
followers. He discusses how a transformational leader provides meaning for followers 
by relating their daily work to the importance of achieving the vision and thereby 
increasing involvement.
There are several problems with the works of this group of authors. First, their 
work suggests a one-best-way of thinking. This predilection explains much of the 
popularity of the books, because they are not hedged with the “ifs and buts” of the 
contingency theorists (Bryman, 1992), but it does not address or explain the traumatic 
nature of the problems associated with turbulent change. The difficulty of 
transformation was emphasized by Harvey Jones, one of the transformation leaders 
identified in the Tichy and Devanna study (1990). As Jones, the former CEO of
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Imperial Chemicals Industries (ICI) says, “I do not believe in the myth of the great 
leader who can suddenly engender in his people a vision and lead them to an entirely 
new world. I believe that reality is more traumatic and demanding” (p. 35).
Second, there are periods of a company’s development which require 
transformational leadership but not organizational leadership. To associate 
transformational leadership with radical change may be dangerous if  senior executives 
come to feel that they are there to engage in organizational transformation because 
they may not take a sufficient account of the stage of the company’s development 
(Bryman, 1992). There is a special risk of this happening with new, outside executives 
who want to make their presence felt and see their role as one of introducing 
fundamental change in line with their own vision.
Third, there is a tendency of best-selling books to focus on the apex of the 
organizational hierarchy by interviewing leaders such as Jobs, Burr, Iacocca, and 
Welch, to understand their leadership approach (Collins, 2001a; Collins & Porras, 
1996; Finkelstein, 2003). This focus closes off discussion of the organizational, 
cultural, and social phenomena associated with organizational maturity which are 
likely the more pertinent focus for the discussion.
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The organizational change theorists can be categorized into three major areas 
of study: leadership competencies required for change, organizational culture and 
readiness for change, and leadership strategies for organizational transformation.
Leadership Competencies Required for Change
The intent of authors who are well-known in the literature on leadership 
competencies is largely to help identify the next generation of senior leaders who will 
be most appropriate for bringing the organization into the future. Finding senior 
leaders on the outside is a high-stakes gamble, because executives, including CEOs, 
now are failing at the highest rate ever: above 50% (Rogers & Smith, 2005). Since 
succession planning strategies are often the purpose of the research, it has been 
separated from discussions around role models or trait theories, even though there is 
overlap. In corporate organizations, succession planning and senior leadership 
development is the purview of organizational change consultants; leadership 
competencies are identified in the hopes that selection, development, and rotation 
programs will be aligned with the strategy and direction of the organization.
Authors generally well-known in this body o f  work include Bennis, McCall, 
Collins, Howard, Bray, Rothwell, McClellan, and Marshall-Miles. The contributions 
of these authors are detailed in the following paragraphs.
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Bennis and his colleagues (Bennis, 1995; Bennis & Nanus, 1985) began their 
work with a 5-year study of 90 outstanding leaders and their followers. They found 
four common traits, or areas of competence, shared by all 90 leaders: management of 
attention, management of meaning, management of trust, and management of self. 
Through their research, they identified four strategies for change: attention through 
vision, meaning through communication, trust through positioning, and the 
deployment of self (Bennis & Nanus, 1985). In their view, “nothing serves an 
organization better—especially during times of agonizing doubts and uncertainties— 
than leadership that knows what it wants, communicates those intentions, positions 
itself correctly, and empowers its workforce” (Bennis & Nanus, 1985, p. 86). The 
definition they applied to transformative leadership was “the capacity to translate 
intention into reality and sustain it” (Bennis, 1995, p. 17).
McCall and his colleagues (McCall, 1997; McCall & Hollenbeck, 2002a, 
2000b; McCall, Lombardo, & Morrison, 1988; McCall, Spreitzer, & Mahoney, 1994) 
were interested in competency research due to their work with senior executives who 
visited the Center for Creative Leadership. They used ratings from over 800 global 
managers to identify characteristics that distinguished high potential from solid 
performers. Their work culminated in the identification of 11 dimensions for the early 
identification of global executives. McCall and his colleagues later identified 
executive career derailers, based on their leadership characteristics, that could predict 
which prominent executives would eventually bum out or get pushed out (McCall & 
Hollenbeck, 2002a).
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Collins discusses what he calls Level 5 Leadership, which refers to leaders 
who are able to combine extreme personal humility with intense professional will 
(Collins, 2001a, 2001b; Collins & Porras, 1996). They do not blame others, external 
factors, or bad luck on changing business conditions. Rather, they give credit to other 
people, no matter the situation.
Howard and Bray (1990) have conducted research at AT&T to determine 
factors that lead to promotions and success at higher levels of leadership. They 
identified characteristics such as poise, positiveness, ability to act on impulse, and 
ambition.
Rothwell (2001), Marshall-Miles (2000), and McClellan (2000) all studied 
succession planning strategies. Rothwell advocated a process-driven approach for the 
early identification of high potential talent to ensure continuity. Marshall-Miles 
proposed the use of cognitive and metacognitive instruments to assess future leaders. 
McClellan, on the other hand, used a competency assessment methodology to predict 
leadership potential.
There are several problems with the research on leadership competencies and 
characteristics. First, it is often reminiscent of early theories on traits. The wording is 
different, but all the competencies are derived roughly around the same library of 
personal, managerial, and leadership competencies (Lombardo & Eichinger, 2005). 
Each author ends up with an interesting array of factors which contribute to 
transformation, but the factors are a mixture of personal traits, follower beliefs, and
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situational characteristics. There is no indication of the relative importance of the 
different factors.
Second, the literature on leadership competencies does not go far enough to 
assist organizations during times of turbulence. A highly reductive approach to 
disaggregating all of the characteristics that leaders must possess into a predictable set 
of characteristics, no matter the context, does not predict ways in which leaders 
respond to the complexity of situations during turbulent times.
Third, there is confusion between transformational and charismatic leadership. 
Trice and Beyer (1990) have tried to draw a distinction between charismatic and 
transformational leadership. They suggest that while both forms of leadership are 
essentially innovative in approach and introduce new organizational cultures, 
charismatic leaders typically create a new organization (and hence new cultures) by 
attracting followers and uniting them in pursuit of a common cause, whereas 
transformational leaders are concerned with changing an existing organization and 
replacing it with a new one (Bryman, 1992).
Fourth, there is occasional recognition that situational factors may affect the 
emergence of transformational leaders. Bass and his colleagues (Bass & Avolio, 1990; 
Bass & Stogdill, 1990) propose that charismatic leaders are more likely to emerge in 
times of growth. They assert that change and crisis are in “organizations that are 
facing rapidly changing technologies and markets” (Avolio et al., 1999, p. 245). Their 
assertion could mean either that periods of turbulence prompt a transformational 
leader to emerge, possibly implying that there is a longing for a savior, and that an
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individual emerges who feels called to do what is necessary; or conversely that the 
transformational leader finds it easier to promulgate a revolutionary new vision during 
periods of uncertainty (Bryman, 1992). The problem with this line of research is that 
although it would seem intuitive that certain characteristics are necessary in times of 
change, there is no specific change literature that details which specific traits are 
universal when it comes to turbulent times.
A fifth concern with the research related to leadership competencies is the 
overuse of surveys which are sent to executives using a variety of different testing 
instruments. The survey data suffer from a lack of consistency in procedures for 
survey administration, as well as lack of validity when considering extrapolation of the 
data for different levels of leaders (Avolio et al., 1999). Rarely are upper-echelon 
leaders studied with qualitative, in-depth interviews—perhaps because so few 
researchers have the opportunity to work with upper-echelon executives on a one-to- 
one basis.
Organization Culture and Readiness for Change
Organizational change theorists have recognized that both the strategies leaders 
utilize to enact transformation and the culture within which the leader acts need to be 
examined (Tichy & Devanna, 1990). Hersey maintains that notions of organizational 
readiness have received insufficient attention in the field of organizational change and 
transformation (Hersey et al., 1977).
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Two authors in the organizational culture and readiness literature have the 
most significance to my investigation: Schein and Hersey. Schein is the seminal author 
in the area of corporate culture. According to Bennis, “Edgar Schein knows more 
about corporate culture and its relevance for organizational transformation than just 
about anybody writing about these issues” (Schein, 1999, p. xi). Bennis’s 
commendation of his colleague is welcomed, because there is a proliferation of 
definitions of culture in the literature. One study cited 164 definitions of culture 
(Kroeber & Kluckholn, 1952). Organizational theorists recognized, just as Fiedler did 
earlier, that the leader cannot be separated from the environment when one is 
investigating leader effectiveness, so culture studies are important.
Behavioral scientists, such as French, distinguish between two notions of 
culture: attitudes toward the organization’s culture and artifacts held inside an 
organization’s culture (French, Bell, & Cecil, 1984). Attitudes include beliefs, 
assumptions, expectations, sentiments and feelings (Whyte & Hamilton, 1996), 
whereas notions related to artifacts include concepts such as company goals, 
technology, structures, policies and procedures, or financial resources (Kroeber & 
Kluckholn, 1952; Schwartz & Davis, 1981). Both Schein and Hersey focus on 
artifacts, which is more relevant to this investigation.
Schein conceived of culture as a rational coordination of the activities of a 
number of people for the achievement of some common, explicit purpose, or goal, 
through division of labor and function, and through a hierarchy of authority and 
responsibility (Schein, 1965). One of Schein’s many contributions is the notion of
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diagnosing the leader’s readiness for culture change. Schein reviewed Lewin’s change
process: unfreezing-^changing->refreezing (Lewin, 1974). Specifically, Schein
(1961) looked at the unfreezing processes affecting leaders during drastic or
unforeseen change. He recognized that when these individuals are removed from their
customary routines, social relationships, and sources of information, many social
support systems are undermined and destroyed. As a result, the drastic and unforeseen
changes can cause individuals to be motivated to change because they feel demeaned
and humiliated when they recognize that their old attitudes or beliefs are unworthy and
ineffective in the new culture. Hersey and his colleagues (1977) looked at
organizational readiness factors for members within the culture, as well as for
leadership. They took Schein’s definition of culture further and applied it to their
definition o f transformational leadership:
a deliberate influence process on the part of an individual or group to 
bring about a discontinuous change in the current state and functioning 
of an organization as a whole. The change is driven by a vision based 
on a set of beliefs and values that require the members of the 
organization to urgently perceive and think differently and to perform 
new actions and organizational roles. (Hersey et al., 1977, p. 525)
The theoretical framework developed by Hersey and his colleagues (see
Figure 1), called the Organizational Readiness for Transformation Model, uses a
4-quadrant approach. The horizontal axis depicts a continuum of unwilling versus a
w illing organizational commitment to change. The vertical axis shows the readiness o f
the organization for change, as either rigid with regard to the status quo or flexible
with regard to the external environment (Hersey et al., 1977). The model identifies
four types of cultures (clockwise): learning, conserving, stagnating, and competing.
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Figure 1. Organizational Readiness for Transformation Model.
Hersey and his colleagues conceived three acts of transformation: recognition 
of the need to revitalize the organization as environmental pressures trigger a need for 
change, creation of a vision which incorporates disparate views from within the 
organization, and institutionalization of the change. They believe that the leader must 
creatively destroy (Hersey et al., 1996) and then reassemble the old and the new, with 
an emphasis on the latter.
In times of turbulent or transformational change, Hersey and his colleagues 
(1977) assert that a transformational leader must commence a deliberate process of 
influencing the organizational members to bring about discontinuous change in the 
current state and functioning of the culture as a whole.
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The problem with this line of research is twofold. First, notions of leaders’ 
effectiveness in any given culture are difficult to measure, given all the variables in 
which leaders operate. From an intuitive perspective, the concept of readiness for 
change is certainly an obvious one, but there is little evidence that the models can be 
transferable from one organizational framework to the next. What is useful is the 
juxtaposition of the variables across a continuum, and that approach was used in this 
study.
Second, this body of literature assumes that the leader can recreate a culture 
and have significant influence upon it, based on top leaders’ manipulation of the goals, 
strategies, and award systems that are embedded in the cultural artifacts of the 
company. This is an untested phenomenon. There are many questions such as whether 
the leader creates the culture or the culture creates the leader (Hatch, 1993; Sarros, 
Gray, & Densten, 2002) and which of the two entities are most sustainable.
Leadership Strategies for Change
This section of the literature review focuses on applying change theories to 
strategies for creating change. “Change management” is often the term used in this 
area of research, as opposed to change leadership, because it suggests how leaders can 
manage through change. An important component for successful change is the ability 
to create a compelling vision that others can follow. Vision is the most widely 
mentioned competency that leaders are expected to have and use. It is considered one
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of the most critical competencies. In fact, creating vision was considered the most 
important cornerstone for success in 18 different leadership studies (Lombardo & 
Eichinger, 2005). These studies included scholars such as Bennis & Nanus (1985), 
Conger (1989), Drucker (1998), Nadler and Tushman (1990), and Tichy and Devanna 
(1986).
The most prevalent theorists in this body of research are Moss-Kanter, who 
focuses on organizational redesign factors; Blanchard, who discusses how high- 
performing work teams can accelerate change; and Argyris, who discusses 
organizational learning during the change process.
Moss-Kanter recommends a 3-variable model to manage change at the 
organizational level: opportunity-enhancing, empowering, and number-balancing 
strategies. Opportunity-enhancing strategies include a modification of job ladders, 
looking at new skill sets and competencies that are required for advancement, and 
changing reward structures for economic efficiency. Empowering strategies require 
flattening of the hierarchy, removing levels, and spreading authority with the goal of 
speeding up decisions, improving communication, and decreasing the discretionary 
aspects of the job (Moss-Kanter 1977). Number-balancing strategies could be utilized 
for affirmative action changes or downsizing of the organization for efficiencies 
(Moss-Kanter 1983).
Moss-Kanter (1977) discusses organizational strategies that can help leaders 
mitigate the potential failure of a change effort. She identifies a number of limiting 
factors that cause a change effort to falter: (a) insufficient support from the top or the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
bottom, (b) inadequate prior diagnosis of the current state or the desired outcome, and
(c) the effect of the change in the decentralized parts o f the organization, beyond
where the change was introduced. Blanchard and his colleagues (Blanchard & Bowles,
1990; Blanchard et al., 1990) recognize that one of the realities of organizational
behavior is that change can only be implemented through the next layer of
management. They emphasize (albeit with dated language) the importance of using
problem-solving team members or departmental team members to accomplish the
aspirations espoused in the vision during the change effort.
The paradox of modem man is that only as the individual joins with his 
fellows in groups and organizations can he hope to control the political, 
economic, and social forces which threaten his individual freedom.
This is especially true now that massive social groupings—in nations 
and combinations of nations—are the order of the day. Only as the 
individual in society struggles to preserve his individuality in common 
cause with his fellows can he hope to remain an individual (Krech,
Crutchfield, & Ballachey, 1962, p. 529).
Blanchard’s contribution included identifying stages of a team’s formation, 
which were: forming^ storming->norming->performing. His diagnostic tool helped 
determine a team’s readiness to face a specific situation, such as the achievement of a 
goal that was aligned to the organization’s vision, mission, and business objectives.
Early work by Argyris (1958,1962,1964) was related to motivation factors 
and examined the effect different management practices have on individual behavior 
and personal growth. He identified seven changes that take place in the personality of 
individuals as they mature into adult people. Argyris saw incongruity between the 
needs of a mature personality and the formal organization as they currently exist. He 
maintained that the classical theory of management is based on Theory X assumptions,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
39
and it creates child-like roles for workers who are frustrated by an inability to follow 
their natural development. Implicit in his theories is the belief that people, if  properly 
motivated, can be basically self-directed and creative at work.
Argyris’s (1994) later work centered on organizational learning. He proposed 
notions of single-loop and double-loop learning, later popularized by Senge (1990), as 
a way for organizations to learn from past mistakes, and become more effective and 
innovative, as well as learn the limits of their innovation. Argyris proposes that 
organizations have the most difficulty at learning when the problems are difficult, 
embarrassing, or threatening—in short, precisely when they need the learning most.
This body of knowledge in the organizational readiness arena certainly has 
merit from a theoretical standpoint. It appears to have relevance across most 
organizations, and diagnostics that are provided by these authors are readily available 
to organizational change consultants in the field.
The problem with the organizational readiness literature is the issue Moss 
Kanter (1977) discusses in her work. It is the problem of time. She points out that 
“progressive as well as reactionary organizations succumb in times of crisis” (p. 284). 
In other words, a new crisis can emerge just as the organization is trying to 
institutionalize a change. An example of a crisis can be a sudden or continued 
economic downturn that will cause the change efforts to fail. In these cases, 
organizational leaders are tempted to go back to originally accepted procedures and 
hierarchical control, because such methods are considered to have been tested through 
the course of time. High-performing work teams’ processes that had been
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institutionalized previously, as well as organizational design features, all need to be 
readdressed during times of turbulence.
Extending the Literature
The literature on change leadership is incomplete, but it can be extended. 
Transformational leadership characteristics, discussed by Bass, Kotter, and Peters and 
their colleagues (Bass & Avolio, 1993; Bass et al., 1987; Kotter, 1995,1996,2002; 
Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Peters & Austin, 1985; Peters & Waterman, 1982), are 
insightful because they serve as a reminder to executives that, as leaders, they need to 
sustain commitment of their followers through the use o f their best role modeling and 
motivational techniques, even though they may feel vulnerable and unengaged 
themselves during turbulence. The cultural theorists, such as Schein (1961) and Hatch 
(1993), remind us that the goals, policies and procedures, technologies, and structure 
all need to be considered when change is affecting the organization during times of 
turbulence. Authors who assess organizational readiness, such as Nadler, Tushman, 
Hersey, and Argyris, provide useful models for assessing readiness, because their 
models support a continuum of factors, rather than a static condition (Argyris, 1958, 
1962,1964,1994; Hersey et al., 1977,1996; Nadler & Tushman, 1990). And finally, 
the strategies that are useful for organizational change, such as those provided by 
Moss-Kanter and Sullivan (Moss-Kanter, 1977,1983; Sullivan & Harper, 1997), are 
practical and concrete. These strategies were considered in the case study.
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What Is Missing from the Literature?
Although both the bodies of literature from leadership effectiveness and 
organizational effectiveness are well and good in their own right, they do not capture 
what happens to leaders at the intrapersonal level. The question remains: to what 
extent do real-life people go through real-life turbulence? The literature is presented in 
an abstract, acontextual, sterile manner as it relates to transformation. Yet, 
organizations in turbulence are going through a fairly significant, deforming change, 
which is far from abstract. The concrete, everyday changes and continued shocks to 
the leaders who must function within the change are not represented. The basic 
assumption in the literature is a static version of reality when, in fact, change is a 
process and a response to dynamic forces that are continually in flux.
Second, the hyper-competitive, political nature of what leaders must do to 
operate under these conditions is not considered. In a highly charged environment, 
there are likely to be highly charged egos, all trying to position themselves for their 
next best career move. The authors in the literature base do not represent what happens 
to these leaders as their lives intersect with one another during times of turbulent and 
relentless change. What is required is a much more human way of looking at the 
organization.
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CHAPTER 3 
DESIGN OF THE STUDY
To build a grounded theory, this research examined the richly described stories 
of executives in a Fortune 100 corporate setting. This chapter includes: (a) 
descriptions of the research setting and subjects; (b) factors in methodology selection, 
such as the rationale for using grounded theory methods; (c) methodological 
considerations; (d) descriptions of the research design as well as data collection and 
analysis processes; and (e) information about how the theory emerged. Also discussed 
are expectations of the research, the audience for the research, and the limitations of 
the research.
Grounded theory methodology proposes a fairly specific data collection 
strategy, including use of a homogenous “theoretical” sample (Creswell, 1998). 
Purposive sampling is characterized by the use of a deliberate effort to obtain 
representative samples of typical groups in the sample (Kerlinger, 1973). In purposive 
sampling, instead of taking a random cross-section of the population to be studied, 
small numbers of people are selected who have specific characteristics, behavior, or 
experience. They were selected to assist in broad comparisons among subjects that the 
researcher thinks are likely to be important (Walker, 1985).
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The study took place in a global technological corporation, with headquarters 
located in the United States Midwest. This company experienced sweeping changes 
during the 1990s.
The criteria used to select subjects for this research were that each person had 
to be: (a) a leader, (b) who was retired from Compass within the last five years, (c) 
who had held an upper-echelon position of authority in the company, and (d) who 
served his/her organization for a period of more than eight years. “Upper-echelon” is 
defined as either working at the vice president (officer) level and directly reporting 
into the president’s office or leading one of the major business units or functions in the 
corporation.
Past leaders were studied, as opposed to present leaders, because they were 
considered to be in a position to reflect on what they did and the effects their actions 
had on the environment and because they were easily accessible. These past leaders 
would be best positioned to see the full picture of their influence upon the culture from 
a longer-term viewpoint. In some cases, they may have shared the autobiographical 
nature of their thoughts with their peers and, in the process, had rehearsed their 
memories of the many years of organizational life. Also, as retired leaders, they were 
best suited to reflect on the most important components of the changes that they 
encountered, because short-term issues related to achieving quarterly results no longer 
bound them.
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Bogdan and Biklen (1992) recommend that the researcher complete an initial 
inventory with selected candidates to ensure that sufficient information exists for 
appropriate data collection and analysis. I began by calling some of the executives I 
knew from Compass to inquire whether or not they believed I would be able to find 
qualified candidates. I also inquired about the legal ramifications, if  any, for subjects 
who had signed confidentiality agreements with Compass. To my surprise, potential 
candidates were unilaterally supportive. Typically, they asserted that the study could 
make an important contribution. In many cases, my initial candidates recommended 
other people who fit my study criteria to be interviewed.
Seven subjects agreed to participate. These leaders were vice presidents, or 
senior vice presidents in marketing, human resources (HR), learning and development, 
research, manufacturing, law, and finance. The one female and six male subjects had 
12-30 years of experience at Compass, 25-35 years of business experience, and had 
left Compass within the last 1-5 years. Some had already taken positions with other 
companies or institutions. Others had decided to formally retire.
Although the viewpoint of the subjects was based on their unique perspectives 
at Compass, as a researcher I made the decision to study a fewer number of people 
from the same organization rather than from a variety of organizations. I opted to have 
in-depth interviews in order to learn about the complexity of the subjects’ experiences 
and exposures during change.
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Rationale for Using Grounded Theory
Grounded theory methods are used to generate or discover a theory. A theory 
simply explains what a phenomenon is and how it works. It explains the phenomenon 
by identifying its main ideas or concepts and by stating the relationships among these 
concepts (Swanson, 1997). Grounded theory is the discovery of theory from data, 
systematically obtained and analyzed in a social setting (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
According to Creswell, the analysis process in a grounded theory approach is a zigzag 
process. The researcher collects data in the field and then analyzes the data. The 
researcher repeats the cycle by going to the field, analyzing the data, identifying what 
data still need to be collected or confirmed, and returning to the field. The number of 
times that the researcher is required to go into the field depends on whether the 
categories of information become saturated and whether the theory “is elaborated in 
all of its complexity” (Creswell, 1998, p. 57).
Grounded theory is appropriate because it: (a) gives voice to the respondents, 
representing them as accurately as possible; (b) discovers and acknowledges how 
respondents’ views of reality conflict with the researchers; and (c) recognizes both the 
art and the science involved in the process and its analytic product. The rigor of the 
grounded theory approach provided me with a set of clear guidelines to build 
explanatory frameworks that specified relationships among concepts (Charmaz, 2000).
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Context
The subjects in the study were examined in a particular time and place, so that 
the descriptions they offered could allow for illustration of complexities. In other 
words, I was interested in the context. In order to illuminate the phenomena of what 
happened and why, I needed to provide a contextual analysis. I will use the label 
Compass to refer to this organization. Compass was examined in a heuristic manner; 
that is, a learning process was provided by going back and forth between the context 
of the environment and the leaders’ descriptions of their experiences in the 
environment (Merriam, 1998).
The research applied inductive reasoning because the focus was on a 
contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context, namely the notion of change 
leadership during turbulent times. I found it useful to examine only one environment 
in a holistic way rather than studying several environments. It allowed me to 
investigate the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context, because the 
boundaries between the phenomenon of change leadership and the context were not 
clearly evident (Yin, 2003a, 2003b). My interest was to examine the interplay between 
the significant factors that contributed to the particular phenomenon of corporate 
leadership during turbulent times and to delve much further in order to pursue 
complex, situational themes (Stake, 2000).
It is important to remind the reader that this was not a full-fledged 
investigation of the Compass setting. Rather, I was looking at the norms, values, and
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material traits of the situation as events shifted during the turbulence. There were 
dramatic flips of power, huge changes in the culture, and structural and process 
changes that influenced the leaders in the study. As the research went on, it became 
more focused on a few of the contextual variables, but only after a careful examination 
of the theoretical context.
Methodological Considerations
Grounded theory methodology proposes a fairly specific data collection 
strategy, including a “homogenous theoretical sample, a specific interview protocol, a 
common data collection approach, and specific ways to store the data” (Creswell,
1998, p. 113). My study followed the approach that Creswell recommended.
Situating the Researcher
In this research, I held two roles: insider and outsider. My role as an insider 
was due to my professional experience working at Compass during its transformation.
I knew from the outset that my beliefs required a systematic investigation. I held a 
position of authority at Compass (upper management in a global corporation). This 
document’s Preface describes my work role with respect to the executives who 
participated in this research and situates me relative to the research as both insider and 
outsider.
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One challenge in this research involved minimizing or eliminating extraneous 
bias in my interviews and data analysis. To ensure that I approached my subjects as 
open-mindedly as possible, I answered my own interview questions prior to the 
interviews, a sort of self-interrogation. A systematic analysis of my own experience 
allowed me to situate myself relative to the data I was collecting and to reveal the 
evolving viewpoints.
I was also an outsider to the research. First, I had held a director-level position 
rather than the officer-level held by my subjects. Second, I left Compass at least four 
years earlier than any of my subjects. At the time of the interviews, I was thoroughly 
engaged in working in another company. Many of the stories that subjects told me, 
although vivid, in retrospect were stories in my peripheral vision at Compass. Upon 
hearing them again, I knew I had a fresh, detached perspective.
Eisner (1998) describes the qualitative research process as one in which “the 
self is the instrument that engages the situation and makes sense of it” (p. 34). My 
interest in the stories as an outsider was to discover knowledge that might be useful in 
other situations. I believe that I was able to identify contributing factors that were 
pertinent to the theory and yet be objective to keep from imposing my own bias onto 
the study.
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Interview Protocol Development and Testing
Research design is the plan, structure, and strategy of investigation, which is 
designed to obtain answers to research questions (Kerlinger, 1973). Research studies 
that are qualitative are designed to discover what can be learned about some 
phenomena of interest (Walker, 1985). The outcome of this study was a generalization 
of results based on an analysis of the deeper understanding of experience from the 
perspectives of the participants selected for the study (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). 
The design of a research study must account for several important questions, including 
the questions required to be studied, what data are the most relevant, and when the 
researcher should use a single case study, as opposed to multiple ones (Yin, 2003a, 
2003b).
This study examined the leaders' behavior, experience, and meaning during a 
time of tremendous turbulence. Research questions were intended initially to uncover 
what leaders do in times of turbulence. But they evolved. As such, I became more 
interested in the meaning of change leadership during turbulence. To test the 
questions, prior to their use, I piloted a questionnaire by interviewing two executives 
from two other multinational companies to determine the relevance of the questions to 
executive experiences during turbulent times. Feedback from these two executives 
indicated that the questions were very relevant to discussions o f turbulent times in 
corporations. The interview protocol is provided in Appendix A.
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The data obtained during the interviews were very relevant for the 
development of the theory. However, I also made use of (a) archival documents that I 
had saved during my Compass tenure, (b) my field journal, and (c) my conversations 
with peers from Compass who experienced the changes at Compass during the same 
time period. Table 2 reveals the archival documents that I studied.
Steps Followed with Respect to Grounded Theory Methods
Primary data were collected from incumbent executives at Compass, who had 
had a stake in the company over a long period of time. In that sense, they were very 
powerful. At the same time, they were operating in an open system facing multiple 
constraints—retaining their own jobs, as long as they reflected the interests of the 
company they were to serve—and managing through a variety of demands that were 
external to the organization, such as shareholders. Table 3 lists the steps taken to 
implement a grounded theory approach in this study.
Data Collection
Primary interview data were collected from seven subjects who held executive 
positions in the corporation. The in-person interviews lasted between two and four 
hours. These executives held the power to make or influence decisions with life- 
changing consequences for employees. As such, I was careful to build their trust and 
have them recognize that I did not have any preconceived notions about the
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Table 2
Archival Materials Examined During this Research
Data Collection
Source Category Archived Materials
Academic Reading Ef Organizational development (OD) literature
Literature Areas 0 Business literature
0 Sociology literature
0 Adult theory literature
0 Psychology literature
Business Materials 0 Crain’s Chicago Business
0 Wall Street Journal
0 Investors Business Daily
0 Business Week
Training Materials 0 Leadership programs
Developed 0 Motivation and coaching programs
0 Professional development programs
0 Quality excellence
0 Executive Speaker Series
Conferences and 0 Hunt Scanlon & Associates
Seminars 0 Gallup Organization
0 Executive Development Association (EDA) 
Network
0 Training International
0 Six Sigma Institute
White Papers and 0 McKinsey & Company
Surveys 0 Hewitt Associates
0 FORTUNE Magazine
0 Bain & Company
0 Deloitte Consulting
(continued on following page)




Source Category Archived Materials
Thought Leaders and 0 Kellogg Business School Faculty
Facilitators 0 Amos Tuck Business School
0 Chicago School of Business
0 Harvard University
Archived Materials 0 Journals
0 Memos
0 Letters of recommendation
0 Award documentations
0 Performance reviews
Interviews 0 Executives from multinational companies 
outside of case
0 Executives in the case study
0 Fellow OD professionals
0 Chief learning officers
Associations 0 American Society of Training and 
Development (ASTD)
0 Corporate Leadership Council (CLC)
0 Sales Executives Council (SEC)
Subscriptions 0 The Economist
0 Harvard Business Review
0 Development Dimensions International
0 Newsletters from speakers sourced
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Table 3
Steps Taken to Apply Grounded Theory Methods to this Research
Step Activity
1. Wrote personal autobiographical sketch related to my career.
2. Reviewed my personal journals, archived materials, and white 
papers to identify relevant documents.
3. Observed, studied, and conversed with fellow leaders and 
executives from many other companies, as well as my own, about 
the relevance of the various change theories as well as change that 
was occurring in their organizations.
4. Conducted formal interviews of two executives, who were not part 
of the original study, in order to establish validity of interview 
protocol.
5. Visited subjects at their homes and had dinner prior to formal 
interview. Tape recorded formal interview for minimum of two 
hours each.
6. Transcribed tapes and wrote own tape-recorded reflections.
7. Began coding transcripts and used constant comparative methods to 
compare individuals' views, situations, actions, accounts, and 
experiences.
8. Compared data from the same individuals with their own data (a) at 
different points in time and (b) incident by incident.
9. Developed categories to assist in comparison methods.
10. Discussed categories of comparison with selected subjects and with 
other organizational theorists.
(continued on following page)




11. Conducted a wide review of the literature from various disciplines, 
including organizational development, psychology, leadership 
development, adult learning, and business literature.
12. Reviewed additional literature related to emerging categories not 
originally studied.
13. Reorganized categories based on a further analysis of the quotations 
from the subjects.
14. Began composing the story of Compass and continued constant 
comparative technique to identify new themes that emerged.
15. Reviewed literature related to new themes.
16. Discussed themes with selected research participants to determine 
relevance.
17. Shared assumptions with selected professionals in the field of 
organizational development to determine whether other theories 
existed that were duplicative of my own.
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rightfulness of the decisions they made. I was aware of the multiple constraints that 
the executives experienced in their roles, such as (a) the need and desire to retain their 
own jobs versus complying with a culture with which they did not agree; (b) managing 
through a variety of demands that were external to the organization, such as 
stockholder and Wall Street expectations; and (c) functioning in highly political, 
stressful situations due to budget reallocations, organizational restructuring, and 
downsizing. I believe that the candor with which they told their stories was due to the 
fact that I had been a part of Compass myself, and they recognized that I could put 
their stories in the proper context.
I had designed my interview questions to be open and reflective. In other 
words, I was not looking for any particular version of the truth behind change 
leadership. Rather, I was looking for truthfulness and authenticity from my subjects 
about the changes they experienced during the turbulence. The leaders in this study 
were invited to tell life stories about their experience of turbulent change. For instance, 
they were asked how they adapted their managerial approach to the change situation 
and how certain events required them to muster up the courage to change or to 
advocate for a decision based on their own convictions. Further, the leaders were 
encouraged to relate their experiences of having to exercise authority during major 
inflection points of change that occurred in the organization. The narrative approach 
claims that by abandoning the attempt to treat respondents’ accounts as potentially 
true pictures of reality, we open up for analysis the culturally rich methods through 
which interviewers and interviewees generate plausible accounts of the world
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(Denison, 1996). Chase (2003) best describes the importance of stories and asserts that
stories inform the relationship between the narrator and culture.
If we take seriously the idea that people make sense of experience and 
communicate meaning through narration, then in-depth interviews 
should be occasions in which we ask for life stories. By life stories, I 
mean narratives about some life experience that is of deep and abiding 
interest to the interviewee . . . .  Narration is a complex social process, a 
form of social action that embodies the relation between narrator and 
culture, (p. 274)
The conversations with my interviewees became more like exploratory 
dialogues. It felt to me as though they were co-investigators in the research. All 
interviews were in-person interviews and took place either at my home or that of my 
subject. Each interview lasted two to four hours. Audiotaping was used so that detailed 
transcripts could be prepared.
Data Analysis
I began my analysis by coding the transcripts based on concepts found in the 
literature. Data were coded and analyzed using the Scientific Software Development 
Program, ATLAS.ti, version 5.2 (Muhr & Friese, 2004). The actual events as seen 
from each subject’s perspective were noted, but rather than learning about the events 
themselves, I was more interested in hearing how different people discussed different 
views about the same situation, the actions they took, and their accounts and 
experiences. Also, I was interested in comparing individuals with themselves and 
checking for consistency of their point of view and then against different points of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
view from other leaders in the same context. I was looking for rational accounts of the 
reality, based on the subject’s viewpoint. At the same time, I was interested in probing 
underlying themes. For instance, based on the events described, I looked to see if there 
were strong individuals persistently pushing to make the event happen, versus a more 
distilled account of collective consensus. Where some events seemed important, I 
looked for the less obvious events that were antecedents to decisions that were made.
Open coding was used for all the data sources, followed by axial coding and 
selective coding. Open coding required a line-by-line analysis of the data. The analysis 
used both in vivo codes (Glaser, 1992) and my own interpretation of coding. Using 
memos, journaling, and information mapping helped ensure that the coding was 
consistent. Axial coding helped identify the major themes from the data. These themes 
showed me that the data had been saturated, because the themes appeared across every 
subject studied. To help build the model, analytical induction methods were used 
based on selective coding. For instance, the model became robust as a result of 
selectively coding the quotations from my subjects a second time. The quotes helped 
the model come alive so that the level of abstraction required in a grounded theory 
methodology could be compared against the stories of the subjects.
Data analysis included coding which was designed to capture the subjects’ 
ways of thinking, including my subjects’ perspectives on people, processes, events, 
activities, strategies, relationships, and social structures (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992).
Coding was not the only data analysis strategy employed. Contextual analysis 
was also used. The analysis included the development of matrix maps, tables, and
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cause-and-effect diagrams that helped me grasp the concepts as a whole (Maxwell, 
1996). Some of these tools will be provided as figures in the ensuing chapters.
After initial coding, I reviewed the code list, looking for similarities and 
relationships, ensuring appropriate distinction, eliminating unnecessary codes, and 
making sure all the codes had a unique meaning to me. I then put the codes into 
families. This step was an iterative process as well. It caused me to reconsider the 
codes and how they fit together, resulting in greater distinction between codes and 
families and more meaningful descriptions of both. For example, in the beginning of 
the open-coding process, I discovered approximately 170 codes. I clustered them into 
meaningful sets using an ATLAS.ti feature called families (Muhr & Friese, 2004) 
Table 4 summarizes results of the first iteration.
Later, families of codes were developed from these definitions and formed the 
basis of the four stages identified in the case study, as well as the behaviors of leaders 
that were representative of the leaders at each stage. A systematic analysis was 
conducted to ensure that the data were trustworthy. First, I listened to the tapes 
multiple times to find new meanings and interpretations. Second, I looked for unique 
perspectives of trusted colleagues in my field who were familiar with the subjects 
and/or the Compass environment. Third, I was conscientious in using a grounded 
theory methodology to ensure objectivity. I also reviewed the codes with my advisor, 
my friends, and the subjects themselves. By this time, I recognized that the grounded 
theory was not about my own experiences at Compass, but was truly about the data.
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Table 4
Names for Families of Codes and their Definitions
Code Definition of Code
Courage The strategies leaders used to ensure that their viewpoints were 
heard.
External signals The rational, financial, and competitive changes that were 
identified as impacting the organization during change.
Influence of The range of examples subjects used when describing the
founder historical influence of the company founder.
Internal signals The emotional, political, and concrete changes described by 
leaders that signaled significant change was occurring in the 
organizational culture.
Leadership The descriptions that subjects identified as either problematic
characteristics or effective traits that leaders exemplify during turbulent 
change.
Leadership The positive and negative approaches that were provided as
strategies examples of demonstrated behavior of leaders during change.
Shifts in thinking The cognitive changes that leaders described as they went 
through the process of ongoing change.
Values The artifacts of the organization that the leaders identified that 
were representative of the organizational culture.
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Data Presentation
In this document, the names associated with quotes from each subject are 
provided with the quotations. These names are pseudonyms to protect the 
confidentiality of the executives. Appendix B lists the pseudonyms and the roles 
associated with each name. Likewise, fictitious names were given to the company, its 
founder, the chief executive officer (CEO), chief operations officer (COO), and the 
CEO’s successor.
The population likely to be most interested in this study will be current 
researchers in the field of organizational development (organizational design, 
leadership in corporations), as well as researchers who are interested in organizational 
change within governmental, educational, or public institutions. I also hope 
practitioners in functional groups such as human resource, corporate universities, and 
organizational development, as well as policy makers in companies, may benefit from 
this research.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE STORY OF COMPASS
The Context: The Early 1990s
Most of the respondents started working at Compass before or right before the 
Total Quality Movement (TQM) had just been introduced. TQM is a model developed 
by Deming (1986) to provide a framework for debate and discussions about measures 
that may lead to improvements in an organization (Nightingale & O'Neil, 1994). With 
the increasing globalization of markets and the liberalization of local economies, it had 
become necessary for businesses all over the world to develop competitive strategies 
that recognized quality management as their focal point (Madu, 1998). In fact, the 
decade had seen an explosion of publications on TQM that introduced a set of tools 
(Blazey, 2000; Brown, 2000; Chowdhury, 2001), as well as a new management 
philosophy that led to changes in the ways people and management worked together to 
produce significant improvements (Godfrey, 1993; Ernst & Young, 1990).
The interest in quality was especially critical because of the competitive 
advantage held by Japanese firms over their European and American rivals at the time 
(Hall, 1996). The philosophy was that quality permeates everything across the 
company, including a managerial strategy and a corporate culture capable of 
sustaining competition through quality practices (Conti, 1993). The quality philosophy
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meant that everything was measured, including: the rate of errors and defects in goods 
produced by the company (Crosby, 1979); the costs of rejects and repairs, warranty 
costs, and inspection and prevention costs (Oakland, 1989); the levels of customer 
satisfaction about service to the customer (Hoff, 1999); and the price level of the 
product and the degree to which the product is considered to be at an acceptable price 
for the customer (Broh, 1982).
The TQM philosophy impacted relationships with both customer stakeholders 
and employee stakeholders. The philosophy meant that even before a new product was 
invented and developed, the research and development engineers at Compass had to 
bear in mind the requirements of law and ecology (Ollila, 1995). Leaders became 
converted to the pursuit of quality as the single most important organizational 
objective for the company. As the company expanded, both the TQM model and its 
derivative, the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) Excellence 
Model (Anyamele, 2004), were institutionalized at Compass. Figure 2 illustrates the 
EFQM model in its original and unmodified version.
The model is useful because it illustrates how quality was perceived at 
Compass, beginning with leadership and incorporating people practices, policies, 
partnerships, and processes to result in people results, customer results, and society 
results, which yielded key performance results. The model served as a reminder that 
every individual leader, employee, or supplier could make or break customer 
satisfaction. Implementing the model required valuing the contribution of the 
individual; everyone held the belief that we were all empowered to make the right
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decisions—from the top of the house (the CEO) to the worker on the factory floor. 
The term used at Compass to emphasize these notions was participative management.


















Figure 2. European Foundation for Quality Management Excellence Model.
Company core values were discussed throughout the interviews. All the 
subjects emphasized the important values of the company in the early 1990s that 
supported participative management. Seven of them are discussed here.
1. Policy and strategy called for treating people with dignity and respect. 
Company values were constantly espoused. Notions of loyalty, respect, empowerment, 
and innovation were part of the vernacular of every company town hall meeting,
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inscribed on every plaque that teams or individuals would win for performance and
spoken in everyday language.
Compass had a culture that actually believed in the value of every 
individual, and that every individual needed to be developed and 
educated, and perform at world-class levels in order to compete in the 
world. And if  you were unable to do that then, you shouldn’t be there, 
but they would give you that option. (Zenglo)
We trained over 3,000 manufacturing associates (in one factory alone) 
to have basic math skills and basic reading and writing skills. So rather 
than saying, “You flunked the test—you’re fired!’ we said, ‘We’re 
gonna be partners in helping you to improve your skills so you’re going 
to go to school two hours a day . . .  on company time.” (Bob)
2. People beliefs: Diversity. Participative management also required treating 
each person with dignity, no matter their ethnic background, national origin, or 
gender.
We really allowed for people who were “not the same as others” to be 
heard. It was the legacy of the CEO at the time. We wanted to be the 
premier employer, and then it was diversity, and setting up day care 
centers. I was really engaged in that, because I was one of the few more 
senior women leaders at the time. (Melissa)
During the first 18 years of my tenure at Compass, the minority opinion 
really counted. So, if you were in a technology discussion, you asked 
for the minority opinion. You saw things very, very differently 
sometimes than your peers. But you were allowed to speak up. (Zenglo)
I put different folks in different roles and tried to build the best balance.
It’s like putting on a symphony the right way. So, the trombone player 
maybe doesn’t like the percussionist, but if  you can get them to play 
beautiful music in the end that’s what matters. (Malcolm)
3. Policy beliefs: Need to reward and recognize innovation. Participative 
management also meant practices that rewarded innovation and risk taking. 
Employees at Compass were encouraged to come up with better, faster, and cheaper
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ways to serve the customer. We were a company of risk takers, who made big bets
with technology and usually won.
I came to Compass because it focused around technology excellence— 
a great drawing point. And they had farsightedness from a historic 
standpoint. They believed in the whole notion of changing the world, 
changing it for the better, doing great things. (Malcolm)
And it was an unbelievable experience because once you got the 
structure the right way, it was like a rocket ship ride. And we rode this 
thing up, and we created the business. You know, when I got there that 
particular business was probably $200M in a year, and when I left the 
company, that business was about $17B or $18B a year! (Bob)
4. Leadership: Belief in loyalty. Because the company was investing in the 
people o f the company, it made sense that loyalty was also expected and long service 
was valued. The culture at Compass was that long-term employees were important to 
the success of the company. In fact, at one point, employees’ sons and daughters were 
encouraged to join the company or to be interns with the company during their college 
years.
The people were hugely loyal to the company, almost as if  it was a love 
affair. People bled [the company color]. They stayed with the company 
a long time. They grew up with the company. I know it sounds “corny” 
but everybody said it was like a family. Look at the friendships that you 
made, that I made, that we will never forget! (Jeremy)
5. Processes: Belief in high performance. The culture was performance- 
driven. The founding fathers of the company, although highly revered, held people 
accountable for performance and then richly rewarded high performance. “We 
fostered a performance-driven culture. We celebrated wins and rewarded 
performance.” (Jeremy)
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I was very successful in establishing plans that I felt very good about, 
my team felt very good about, and my immediate boss felt very good 
about, and then executing with excellence against those plans. Some­
times it was doing very difficult things, but we consistently executed 
these plans, knowing there are higher purposes and greater challenges 
ahead. (Malcolm)
6. Partnerships and resources: Belief in social responsibility. In addition to
being family-oriented, the company was also community and civic-minded, which
included welcoming immigrants.
We were a community that welcomed immigrants. If you look at every 
wave of immigration in the United States from the 1930s on, Compass 
was home to those immigrants, whether it be Russians, Vietnamese,
Cubans, etc. We did a very good job of incorporating them into 
Compass, and usually three generations later, there were members of 
that family who were in senior management positions. I think that 
concept of longevity, loyalty, trust, played a big part. (Bob)
7. Policy and strategy: Belief in empowerment. Decisions were decentralized
so that managers could make their own decisions for their own business, with the
belief that each business unit or region of the country was closest to the issues raised
by the customer or the employee and could therefore respond with a sense of urgency
and understanding.
We said to managers, “Look, we have a medical plan that covers X 
dollars per employee, but if you exceed that because it is a catastrophic 
illness or something, you can make the decision to pay those expenses, 
but you will have to do it within your own budget.” I remember one of 
my more difficult decisions was, “Do I actually fund this cancer 
treatment for the son of one of my employees, which had already 
exceeded the million-dollar cap, and if I did, so then I need to lay off 
three of our employees? So, do you fund that individual or do you lay 
off three employees?” But the power was that it was my decision.
(Zenglo)
So, having good, well-grounded fundamentals, having good belief 
systems, having value systems that are in sync with the, thank God,
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with the corporation, because Compass, at least then, had great value 
systems, and having the ability to delegate, and trust both the success 
and failure of others, and then having the will to fail yourself if  you 
were wrong, because you didn’t have time to study it for three months.
That was my modus operandi for my whole career. (Mike)
From the quotes related to each of these corporate values, it becomes apparent
how proud the leaders were of their company. The company reputation, principles, and
vernacular were well documented and supported. The values were the enablers for
leaders to identify policies, people processes, and appropriate dealings with customers
and suppliers. During this early period in the company history, it seemed as though all
parts of the company were on the right course. Indeed, it felt like a healthy
organization.
Leaders Experience Turbulence
There were four phases of turbulence that the leaders experienced at Compass. 
These phases were sequential, and the rate of change heightened as each phase 
progressed. The ensuing portion of this study will describe each phase and the 
emotional and behavioral characteristics described by the leaders who were 
interviewed. Figure 3 depicts the phases and the external signals of marketplace 
conditions that occurred.















Figure 3. Phases of Turbulence and External Signals.
Phase 1: Denial
Prior to the 1998 time frame, all the businesses at Compass were doing well. 
The company had expanded into a multinational company. It was known for its 
technological prowess and was described as a powerhouse of technology and research, 
with a well-reputed engineering staff and a deep supply of patents that seemed to 
position the company well for the future. But external indicators, such as changes in 
technology and heightened competition, were the markers of instability and should 
have been recognized by the leaders. Each of the subjects interviewed commented on 
these indicators.
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There were some huge external shocks to the system and, to name a 
few, we had several sizeable investments in R & D that did not work.
Research and development had been seen as a huge growth platform for 
the company, and became a financial nightmare with many lawsuits.
Then there was the Asian currency crisis, which destabilized the 
company overnight. Then there was the Dot.com bust, the Telecom 
bust, the Y2K bust, and the 9/11 shocks to the system. These shocks all 
compressed, it seemed, into a very short time frame. (Terry)
Another subject described the problems at the time: “We had naive beliefs in
foreign companies and governments that held loans with Compass. Some reneged on
their commitment for payment” (Melissa). And, a third said,
Compass had just come off an unbelievable drunken-sailor imitation. 
Remember how good things were? The stock had split twice. We had 
income falling out of the sky. And profits falling out of the sky. And 
then, overnight, the bottom fell out-—not only for Compass, but for 
everybody . . . .  We went from world leader to world loser. (Jeremy)
These changes were the external drivers to the first major restructuring of the
company. The corporate restructuring that started in 1998 required the consolidation
of some businesses, spinning off other businesses, and outsourcing certain functions,
which caused a huge shift in the size of the employee base over an 18-month period.
Approximately 10% of the workforce was laid off (a euphemistic way of saying fired).
The lay-offs were a shock to the company culture, because downsizings of that
magnitude had never occurred before. Overseas market competition had increased
considerably. Compass, which had been the only provider of the technology, suddenly
was faced with a market o f  small companies making copy-cat products and marketing
them at considerably less cost.
In spite of the huge external signals that competition was increasing at an
alarming rate, leaders’ behaviors demonstrated that they were unwilling or unable to
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pay attention to the market signals. Two behaviors that emerged were: (a) leaders tried 
to promote optimism through the use of a stated vision, and (b) leaders tried to 
establish their political position by emphasizing their power and decision-making 
authority in the organization.
Leaders Promote Optimism
The promotion of optimism was accomplished, almost to the point of hubris, in 
the company with the belief that bad times may come, but surely we will prevail. 
Leaders ignored market data and demonstrated a lack of consciousness about the 
nature of competition, risks, and the size of the change that was required. The belief 
among the leaders was that Compass was so strategic and so successful that there was 
no end in sight to its growth. Leaders discussed the “hockey stick phenomenon” often 
taught in business schools, which touted that businesses can have a dip in profits, 
followed by a huge spike in earnings that can last for a long time. Ignoring the facts 
was apparent in most of the speeches that the leaders gave. Rather than talking about 
competition, lower profits, or potential business risks, leaders were expected to discuss 
the latest company vision and pepper it with notions of how the vision was aligned 
with the company values.
Optimism is evident in the description one of the subjects gave when recalling 
a conversation he had held with the CEO:
I was called on to help with reorganizing the company (to put together
disparate businesses into one mega business sector). One of my first
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comments was, “You know you can’t put a multi-billion dollar gorilla 
(the mega business) in one place, because it’s too much for one leader 
to manage.” The CEO’s comment to me was, “We’re going to be a 
$100B company, and there will be five more of those!” (Terry)
People’s egos got in the way, because they thought they were in charge 
of everything and didn’t want to listen to anyone who had, you know, a 
sense of “Let’s look at it this way,” or “What happens if  the market 
doesn’t materialize the way you think?” It was, “We’re in charge; 
we’re responsible; don’t tell us what to do.” (Malcolm)
We were an organizational culture that was confident, constant, and to 
some extent, naive. We treated people with dignity and respect. We 
talked about the long-term and values, and thought, “We’ll talk about 
profits a long time off in the future.” (Jeremy)
Strategic decisions involve a commitment of large amounts of organizational
resources for the fulfillment of organizational goals and purposes through appropriate
means (Shrivastava & Grant, 1985). Strategic decisions have an impact on many
aspects and functions in the organization and influence its direction and structure in
fundamental ways (Christensen et al., 1982).
Change leadership literature discusses setting a vision for the company and
then cascading the vision through the organization with aligned goals, strategies, and
tactics. Generally, this literature does not discuss decision-making processes because
that content is its own very large body of research.
In the world of these executive leaders, there was a considerable amount of
discussion behind the scenes as to whether or not the vision was well-defined,
accepted, able to be executed, or even within their control.
And things were changing because of Wall Street. I mean, really Wall 
Street is playing a huge part in organizational change and 
organizational leadership. Because now, they’re getting intimately 
involved with your business, and letting you know what you should and
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shouldn’t be doing, and now they are telling you, based on your stock 
price, what to do, and they want to know your strategy sessions. And 
they want to know the nitty-gritty details of your product lines, and 
what is coming out next quarter, and the next, and what didn’t come out 
as you promised. And, all of a sudden, now we’ve got this whole new 
factor in business called Wall Street. And you wouldn’t think of it as an 
organizational impactor, but it was huge.
And Brian couldn’t deal with them or didn’t want to deal with them. It 
was really scary thing to work with them. And they were very 
unpredictable in what we thought they wanted. So we’re making 
decisions, thinking Wall Street’s going to like it, and then they didn’t 
like it, and people were getting upset. And it became this big ugly thing 
that really we didn’t have our arms around, and we didn’t understand 
how it worked. And Brian didn’t like them, and he didn’t think they 
should be in our business that tightly either. (Melissa)
Melissa is discussing how Brian, the CEO, and certainly many other executives 
in Compass became disempowered because of external factors. The stock market 
fluctuations caused major changes at Compass and everyone in the company 
recognized it. In fact, the stock price was discussed almost daily among leaders 
because stock options were a big part of the reward system. At the same time, no one 
had a sense that they controlled the fluctuations in the price. Unfavorable coverage in 
Business Week or the Wall Street Journal would have leaders worried. Gradually, 
decision-making authority was being reduced because the CEO recognized a need to 
manage the business more tightly.
Although an analysis of the decision-making authority is not a part of this 
study, some discussion of the approach undertaken at Compass is required. Prior to the 
turbulence, Compass leaders had a great deal of autonomy in the decision-making 
process for their own functions; and in some cases, they used their power in a 
grandiose way.
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Research shows that executives often use a filtering process based on their own 
management perceptions which influence the course of action or strategic choices that 
they need to make (Knight et al., 1999). The poet W. H. Auden once wrote that every 
genius possesses an essential error, some skewed distortion of reality that informs his 
work (Heil, Bennis, & Stephens, 2002). The error can be detected throughout his 
approach, but it is like “invisible weaving”; it may not be discernible at the surface 
(Heil et ah, 2002).
A rational approach to decision making is assumed, and most decision makers 
do not rely on decisions just based on hunches or gut feelings (Keast, 1996). In fact, 
Mitzberg’s critique with rational approaches is that decision makers often deviate from 
rational approaches in significant ways (Mitzberg, 1973). For example, Mitzberg’s 
1973 influential studies of what managers actually do, as opposed to what they are 
supposed to do, or what they say they do, showed that decision makers rarely, if ever, 
employ rational approaches (Sternberg et al., 2000). Instead, they typically grope 
along with only vague impressions about the nature of the problems with which they 
are dealing, with little idea of what the ultimate solution will be until they have found 
it (Mitzberg, 1973).
Executives deviate most strongly from rational approaches to decision making 
because of their propensity to act before all the facts are in (Sternberg et al., 2000). For 
Compass there was a period of rapid growth. It was assumed that the market was 
growing, and that Compass would increase its share in the market. Decision making 
included discussions related to product innovation, technological and operational
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efficiencies, customer service, and global expansion—in short, all the approaches that
were considered critical for the times.
In order for organizations to grow, or even to maintain their current 
sizes, business firms have to seek continually or continually invest in 
new marketable products, new methods, and new marketing, or even 
new ways of financing their activities. They have to invest in new 
facilities and adapt their organizational structure and staffing to new 
activities. They have to try to anticipate changes in the environment 
and the economy and that industry—that will affect the profitability of 
current and contemplative operations. As both product (and other) 
innovation and the unfolding of economic events are fraught with 
uncertainty, strategic decision making is a chapter in the topic of 
decision making under uncertainty—in fact, massive and unending 
uncertainty. (Simon, 1999, p. 133)
But, anticipating the future is not like forecasting the weather. In the case of 
weather forecasting, the consequences are not long-lasting, since the weather changes 
every day, and life goes on its merry course. Anticipating the future, on the other hand, 
calls for effectiveness in planning that requires accurate estimates of the time paths of 
new trends in order to provide adequate lead time for planning responses with ample 
resources. In an uncertain world, forecasting strategically must be informed with 
feedback, so that as time “squeezes out uncertainty” (p. 135), attention can be focused 
on the issues that really matter and the timing of responses can be adjusted.
Leaders Establish Their Political Position
Political positioning was evident by leaders who had been running major 
businesses on their own, in a decentralized manner, due to the participative nature of 
the company. These leaders wanted to be the CEO themselves someday. They were
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making poor decisions, because they were trying to position their own business unit
favorably. They were not interested in the success of the company overall.
We made too many mistakes and part of it was by managers who 
refused to tell the truth in an environment in which managers were 
permitted to make key decisions. So when it became, I think, obvious 
that people had lied, especially about the change in technology, then the 
culture was forced to change and put many more constraints on 
management. (Zenglo)
You know you had people who we thought someday would be the CEO 
who were among the biggest defenders of the status quo. And so they 
made really, really, really bad decisions. And then they rammed 
decisions down everybody else’s throats. So, not only did they take 
their business down, but then they would take Business Unit A down, 
and then Business Unit B down with them, because they would kinda 
bully them into saying, “Don’t second-guess me shipping so many 
units. You make sure you get those parts!” The folks in the other 
business units would say, “Look, we’re not trying to do that, but here’s 
the implication for the company. Are you sure you’re gonna do that, 
and here’s your run-rate. You say you’re gonna do that, man? That 
means you have to produce this many new units over the second half of 
the year.” And so there were some people drinking their own Kool-Aid 
you know. They just sort of, by the force of their will, they would make 
this happen, even against facts or mere facts. (Terry)
Both Zenglo and Terry are discussing the hubris that existed at Compass
among some of the top leaders who were in charge at the time. They made decisions
that disempowered the leader of one business unit because she had a bigger share of
the customer base. At the same time, these leaders were pretending that problems did
not exist, or in some cases were lying about the problem.
In listening to these executives discuss some of the mistakes of the past at the
hands of other executives at Compass, I had to wonder if there was some sort of
strategic blindness that had occurred in the minds’ eyes of these executives. Hindsight
has told us that, certainly, there were dire consequences that were a result of the
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decisions made at this juncture in Compass’s history. One has to wonder, how could 
such powerful, privileged executives make or influence decisions with life-changing 
consequences for the company in isolation?
In fact, they were not working solely on their own behalves. Leadership 
involves a process of negotiation with other leaders. It depends on the willingness of 
some leaders, either as a result of pressure or inclination, to surrender, at least in part, 
to others who have the power to shape and define their own reality (Smircich & 
Morgan, 1982). They were working in open systems, facing multiple constraints—that 
is, retaining their jobs as long as they reflected the interests of the places they served, 
and as long as they could manage a wide variety o f demands externally imposed on 
the organization (Moss-Kanter, 1983). Three powerful pressures played on these 
executives: the Compass Culture, the political nature of the job, and the individuals’ 
own experiences.
Compass’s culture included a participative, decentralized environment at the 
time. As such, strategic decision making involved multiple partisan members who had 
to interact over extended periods o f time to reach semiconsensual decisions. This 
culture was partly due to the nature of the supply chain. One business unit supplied 
parts to another business unit for several strategic reasons, for example, the need for 
operational efficiencies as well as to ensure that no one business became 
disproportionately powerful so that it would drag down the rest of the business units at 
Compass.
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Due to the business structure, strategic decision making involved technical 
problem solving, social adjustment, political bargaining and negotiations, and 
organization-wide communications (Shrivastava & Nachman, 1989). Thus, decision 
making depended more on group processes and cross-departmental or cross-divisional 
boundaries than on the behavior or interactions among two or three individuals 
(Mitroff & Mason, 1982). In many ways, the business units at Compass (at the time) 
looked like an organized anarchy (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2000), in which 
ambiguity seems to obscure intelligible procedure in the decision-making process 
(Hickson, Astley, Graham, & Wilson, 1981). In organized anarchies, there is no 
guarantee that the solutions that are adopted follow logically from the nature of the 
problem. Rather, solutions may exist independently in the minds of decision makers— 
for example, as pet projects—and then be attached to problems as they arise, whether 
such attachment is logically appropriate or not. As Hickson and his colleagues tell it, 
“Solutions are looking for problems, rather than problems looking for solutions” (p. 
175).
The second pressure to act was due to the political nature of executive decision 
making at Compass. Although there was an absence of controls in the environment at 
the time at Compass, it is difficult to infer the degree to which organizational 
outcomes reflect a leadership effect as opposed to forces outside a leader’s control 
(Lieberson & O'Connor, 1972). For example, we do not know what might have 
happened at Compass had different men and women been the leaders at the time.
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Nonetheless, leaders exerted dominance, because they were rewarded for it.
Specifically, they were rewarded for achieving their business unit’s goals more than
they were rewarded for achieving the overall goals of Compass. We often lose sight of
the fact that the directive autocrat is not some misanthrope or ogre, but merely a
person who is paid to make important decisions, set the salient goals for his or her
business unit, and direct subordinates (Muczyk & Steel, 1998). When organizations
have more than one goal, the magnitude of restrictions on a leader’s options may vary
with the particular goal, and then the problem of rewards and alignment becomes more
complex (Lieberson & O'Connor, 1972).
At Compass, we often would discuss culture and argue about whether the
decisions that were being made, based on the change, were in line with the culture.
The difficulty was in characterizing what the Compass culture really was at that time.
I would argue that there’s no such thing as “A Culture.” I think a big, 
complex institution like Compass has multiple cultures, and it has 
cultures overlaying one another. So there’s the culture based on the 
Founder, that was real, and also misunderstood and sometimes 
misinterpreted. There was the business culture, in each product group.
There was the cluster of cultures that represented several business.
There was the country culture, the corporate headquarters culture, the 
factory culture, the engineering culture. All these cultures have both 
positive and negative aspects to them.
Underlying that, I believe that the heart of the company, George, was 
wise in that he knew that if the head of finance didn’t do his job to beat 
the shit out of people to make more money, more revenue, more profit, 
then the company would not grow and be credible. And he let him do 
that. But, he also knew that if he didn’t let the head of HR use the 
power of his office to maintain a culture of integrity and respect and 
mutual dependency, and all those cultural niceties, that we used to 
throw out, that he would have a crappy company. (Mike)
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Based upon empirical observations, Miles and Snow (1978) described four 
strategic archetypes who represent alternative ways of adapting to change. These are 
defender, prospector, analyzer, and reactor. Prospectors are more innovative and 
willing to experiment with new ideas than the other strategy types. Defenders preserve 
their organizations through the use of remembering past norms and traditions that 
were favorable, and thus dominate present behavior. Analyzers base decisions on facts 
and data, while reactors are more inclined to make spontaneous decisions that are not 
data-driven (Hurst, Rush, & White 1989). The subjects in my study consistently 
described the leadership at the time as defenders of their proverbial turf, unwilling to 
listen to reason or adjust their strategy based on the data at hand.
The third reason pressure was placed on the leaders was that their experience 
told them that past success would breed new success. “The test of a first-rate 
intelligence,” F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote, “. . .  is the ability to hold two opposing ideas 
in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function” (Tierney, 1992). What 
this mindset demands is an ability to manage ambiguity or paradox. But, because of 
the norms, values, and expectations the executives brought with them from their past 
experience, they were not indifferent about the type of explanations and predictions 
that made sense to them from the past.
The literature on attribution theory has noted that a person seeks to develop 
causal schemata that are not accurate but that provide an illusion of power and 
personal efficacy, which colors the explanations of actions developed and held 
(Pfeiffer, 1981). Such a predisposition is exacerbated by the executive’s perceived
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intelligence based on his/her position and rank in the company. People easily can
make the step from the existence of a reward system that pays executives large sums
of money to the justification of why that reward is warranted (Sternberg, 2001).
The competency theorists, who study successful executives, repeatedly note
the importance of the ability to deal with ambiguity as a competency needed by
executives facing change (Collins, 2001a, 2001b; Hogan, 2001; Howard & Bray,
1990; McCall & Hollenbeck, 2002a; 2002b; McCall, Spreitzer, & Mahoney, 1994).
Other theorists have suggested the importance of knowing the limits of one’s own
knowledge base and then trying to go beyond it (Sternberg, 1998). For example,
Meacham (1990) maintains that an important aspect of wisdom is an awareness of
one’s own fallibility. Kitchener and Brenner (1990) also emphasize the importance of
knowing one’s own limitations.
The limitations imposed on leaders at Compass were not enough to stem the
downturn in the business. As one of my subjects explained, his main regret was not
having been more vociferous in warning fellow executives about his alarming
recognition that headcount continued to grow in spite of the market signals that
showed revenue was on a downward trend.
Worldwide, yeah, we had about 700 sites, if you go back to Compass in 
the beginning of the new millennium. We took that down to somewhere 
in the 400s, when I was in that role. By the time I left, we were down to 
the 300 range. (Terry)
By the late 1990s at Compass, a new phase of turbulence was occurring. It was 
becoming clearer that the latitude the executives had previously enjoyed in their roles 
would be diminished due to the lack of leadership that existed in the company at that
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time. To be sure, Wall Street was a factor because market share was diminishing, but 
the leaders had caused much of the problem themselves, because a few of them had 
proven that they could not be trusted to make decisions that were good for the 
company as a whole. The lack of leadership focused on the overall company caused 
businesses to be centralized, layoffs to begin, and leaders to position themselves and 
their organizations more aggressively than had been present in the earlier years.
My experience, and the experience of my colleagues, was that as the 
businesses became more and more centralized, there was less of an opportunity to 
make a difference and to feel empowered to make decisions. As one of the subjects 
(Melissa) told me at the time, “We have been neutered and unable to make decisions 
for our people, and in front of our people. How tragic is that?”
A bureaucratic nightmare commenced. The routing of signatures was required 
for even the simplest of requirements to run a department. Structures that needed to be 
put in place with specific roles and responsibilities for headcount could not be 
completed because people were being laid off. There were initiatives assigned from 
the corporate headquarters that were imposed on the business units, irrespective of 
need. The global nature of the company further exacerbated the bureaucratic nature of 
the decisions. For instance, whereas one business unit or a certain region of the world 
may have been flourishing, it did not matter. The centralization of decisions meant that 
there was a one-size-fits-all phenomenon occurring and everyone was expected to 
comply. However, in spite of the limitations imposed on the leaders at Compass, the 
drastic changes were not enough to stem the downturn in the business.
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Unfortunately, turbulent change continued. Leading-edge new models that had
been developed did not sell. The customers did not keep knocking on Compass’s door
as had been expected. A series of miscues had occurred. There were some R & D
investments that did not work, which in turn put financial pressure on the company.
There was a continual, marked increase in the number of significant competitors and
technology was changing at warp-speed. Also, there was volatility in certain
businesses that had heavy capital investments, which caused peaks and valleys in
revenue generation, which put pressure on the profit and loss statements (P&L) that
Wall Street used when evaluating the financial strength of the company.
If you go back and read the business articles from 2000-2005,1 don’t 
think there was one article ever published about the CEO that was 
positive. One writer from the Wall Street Journal and one from 
Business W e e k literally went after him. And so you could ignore 
that for so long, but regrettably, shareholders and your board can’t.
(Jeremy)
We owned 80% of the marketplace, and we let it slip through our 
fingers by not recognizing the data that were in the desk drawers of 
engineers and senior managers that rejected it because they were 
making so much money. (Melissa)
Leaders began to recognize that incremental adjustments and fine-tuning of the 
current situation would not work. What was required were massive changes for the 
company’s strategy, structure, culture, and processes. According to Hersey and his 
colleagues (1977), one of the distinguishing features of low turbulence is that change 
can be managed and contained, whereas in high turbulence, there are global pressures
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and structural changes in the organization that cause a deeply felt and pervasive 
change on the part of most members of the organization. At this stage, leaders at 
Compass had now been shocked into this realization.
Structural Change Strategies
Three major structural change strategies were then systematically employed at 
Compass to change the organization. These were similar to the Three Strategies Model 
Moss-Kanter (1983) proposed as critical for change. The three strategies included: 
number-balancing, opportunity-enhancing, and empowering.
Number-B alancing
The first strategy, number-balancing, included downsizing of the organization
for the sake of efficiency (Moss-Kanter, 1983). One subject, from the finance
department, remembered the first number-balancing strategy Compass took and
identified it as an important point of introducing turbulence.
Well, if we really look at, you know, the turbulent times, I think was 
1998 is probably where I’d focus on turbulent times—when we took 
our first major restructuring of the company. So, relative to turbulent 
times, from a leadership perspective, you know that was really it. And, 
again, we took about a $2 billion dollar charge in ’98 to restructure the 
company. (Terry)
As a result of the continuing problems, the finance department was asked to 
put together a restructuring plan. The job was to ask the following questions: (a) What
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synergies across the business units existed? (b) How could certain businesses be
combined that would decrease the bureaucracy? (c) What redundancies were there
across several business units such that cost savings could be recognized? (d) Were
there any businesses that needed to be outsourced or sold?
Only a select few people knew about the restructuring because of the
detrimental effect it would have on the employee base, on the press, and on the
financial markets. The first restructuring was a big surprise to everyone because no
one saw it coming.
I remember one of the guys that was reporting to me had no regard for 
business performance. And, so we’re talking about general salary 
increases. And, at the time Compass was doing about 2% profit. Okay?
And, I say, “All right, what’s your general salary increase 
recommendation for your regional team?” And he says, “9.5%!” I go, 
“Stephen, are you crazy?” and he says, “Well, we’re going to lose 
everybody!” And I said, “Yeah.” He goes, “No, we need the salary 
increase because we’re competing with all these other regional 
companies who will steal our folks away.” And I go, “Stephen, wake 
up! I’ll give you a choice. I can go to Brian and say we’re still working 
on the general salary increase proposal, or you can tell him yourself 
that you want 9.5%, and then I’ll replace you after he fires you. Okay?
Because right now, if you come to me with 9.5%, I’m going to fire you 
instead of him.” And he just could not understand! (Jeremy)
Jeremy's story highlights two characteristics of Compass at the time. The first
is the denial by one of the middle managers that the business was in trouble. The
second is the attempt made by Jeremy to provide honesty and transparency in decision
making and to help a fellow  employee understand the urgency o f  the need for change.
The traits exhibited by Jeremy are exactly those recognized in the literature on
transformational leaders.
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Due to the urgency of the situation, members of the finance community were 
only given a month to get approval from the board finance committee and then six to 
seven more weeks for implementation. As a result of their efforts, one large umbrella 
organization was created. “It was a whiplash effect. [People said] ‘Hey, I’ve been here 
30 years! Compass is not going to shoot me! I don’t have to work any harder.’” 
(Jeremy)
Opportunity-Enhancing
The second strategy, opportunity-enhancing, involved the modification of how 
career paths were defined, through the use of technical job ladders for engineers. The 
purpose of the modification effort at Compass was to try and shift the focus of the 
engineers from an engineering mindset to a marketing mindset. The reason for the new 
emphasis was that it was thought that the engineers were out of touch with the 
marketplace and were designing products with many “bells and whistles” (a terms 
used for technical features that were embedded in the products), without a clear idea 
that these were features that people would care to purchase. In fact, the products had 
not been selling well to nontechnical populations. Therefore, the leadership decided 
that the best way to change performance was to change the reward systems in order to 
bring about change. In this case, the change involved a degradation of pay and title.
Malcolm and Bob talked about a program of recognition for engineers that was 
eliminated. Their story is a good example of how certain parts of the organization
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recognized that change had to occur while other parts tried desperately to maintain the 
status quo.
There were a set of issues around the engineers and the ways in which 
they had been put on a pedestal. The Founder had put in place a set of 
structures to emphasize excellence in engineering; one of them was the 
Gold Badge Program. Once you had 10 patents, your badge was gold, 
but it was really quite a mark of distinction to be a Gold Badge Person.
(Bob)
The other thing that had been done was to establish the notion of dual 
tracks, so there were vice presidents of the technical staff, who had 
significant roles in the company. In a meeting, it was determined that 
this was inappropriate. They were going to re-badge everybody and 
abolish the Gold Badge Program. And at the same time, they were 
trying to reduce the number of vice presidents in the company, which 
had gotten out of hand. And one of the ways they were going to do that 
was to eliminate all vice presidents of the technical staff. Therefore, 
they were sort of abolishing the whole dual track system. (Malcolm)
Empowering
The third strategy, empowering, required flattening of the hierarchy, that is, 
removing levels and spreading authority in certain parts of the organization (Moss- 
Kanter, 1977).
The flattening of the hierarchy started at the vice president level and eventually 
included director and management levels. I specifically remembered listening in on a 
conference call in 1999, which then-CEO Brian held with the company officers (vice 
presidents). In that conference call, he had to tell the officers of the company that fully 
50% of them would be without careers at Compass within a year because of the global 
restructuring of the company.
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Flattening of the organization affects members tremendously because it means 
that fewer people have decision-making authority and budget allocations. Employees 
who were once managers of large departments are often relegated to lower positions 
managing projects and programs.
Transforming the Culture in a Proactive Wav
Brian knew the required changes were dramatic. They would involve putting in 
place a new set of leadership behaviors, new policies, new product platforms, and new 
structures. The change he was seeking required a reconceptualization of the old to 
make way for the new, and hopefully, more productive future.
The CEO was using transformational leadership strategies that were well- 
known in the organizational theory literature at the time, even though organizational 
theory is a relatively young science (Else, 2004). The strategy is known as “frame- 
breaking,” which means breaking some of the conventional wisdom of the culture to 
bring about a sense of urgency and a shock to the system. If successful, executives 
would foresee the need to instigate major changes in order to deal with anticipated 
environmental threats or to take advantage of new opportunities (Nadler & Tushman, 
1990; Tichy & Devanna, 1990).
The challenge in transforming a culture in a proactive way is very difficult.
The transformational leader is increasingly necessary because of the unstable, 
competitive environment that most business organizations face today (Tichy &
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Devanna, 1990). However, unless there is a perceptible crisis to galvanize people to 
action, there is enormous resistance to change, resistance that does not show up until 
later in the process (Conger, 1989; Sullivan & Harper, 1997).
The leaders I interviewed were highly aware of the need to galvanize people in 
order to help them overcome resistance. They knew that they could not pray and hope 
that things were going to get better. The philosophy of the army that “hope is not a 
method” (Sullivan & Harper, 1997) was clearly in their minds.
At that point in time, the leaders spoke about recognizing the importance of (a) 
communicating effectively, (b) maintaining their own credibility, and (c) reaffirming 
the company values.
Leaders Communicate Authentically
The leaders knew that they needed to be as honest and transparent as possible, 
knowing that some things needed to be kept confidential. They also recognized that 
they did not have all the answers. There were uncertainties and, in some cases, 
muddle-headed confusion on the part of the leaders, but they appeared officially as if 
these were clear-headed strategies that would position the organization for the next 
step.
Actually the changes were fragile ones. They needed to exist alongside the 
residues of an old system. Leaders described how they understood the gravity of the 
situation, how they tried to communicate using as much data as possible in order to
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appeal to both mind and hearts, and how anxiously they tried to help people get on
board with the changes. In fact, when I asked my subjects about their definitions of
change leadership, they all described concepts of communication that included the
ability to bring others to a place where they would not naturally arrive by themselves
(see Appendix C).
You talk to the employees at the town hall meetings. You talk to them 
about what this means to them, and what it means to us, and quite 
honestly, we had to tell them at the time, what we didn’t know. You 
didn’t know at the time how it was really going to work out. We didn’t 
have all the names of the people who were going away. We just kind of 
put targets out there. (Terry)
You have to develop your own style around communication, and you 
have to accept the fact that staying the same is unacceptable. That’s 
death—the longer you stay the same, it’s only a matter of time before 
you start withering away. And so accept it. Embrace change. And then 
figure out a way that works best for you and don’t hope that problems 
go away. They won’t. (Melissa)
Being as visible as they were, these leaders knew that their very careers and,
indeed, their very reputations rode on their ability to communicate the change and
make their people get on board with the changes.
It was a little scary, because you were kind of running. You were out 
there naked and you had never been there before. And the organization 
is all lined up behind you saying, “Ok, which wall do we knock down?”
And sometimes there wasn’t even a wall there! (Jeremy)
Whereas Terry and Melissa discussed how to communicate effectively, Jeremy
spoke of the fear that many leaders have about suggesting that things may get better
when they actually might get worse. The intrapersonal components of leadership are
rarely understood because it is so unusual for a leader to express emotions such as
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fear, anger, or sadness openly. Instead, effective communication is emphasized. In 
fact, followers prefer an honest rendition of what the future might hold.
The culture at Compass at the time was a transformational culture. As such, 
there existed a sense of purpose and a feeling of family (Bass et al., 1987). Leaders 
espoused organizational goals and encouraged employee commitment to the 
organization’s purpose and vision (Sarros et al., 2002).
Leaders’ communication with the employees at the time was a genuine wish to 
be as honest and complete as possible in their communications with staff members. 
This candor in itself is an example of demonstrating the operating principles of dignity 
at work, namely, respect for the individual. The transformational leadership literature 
consistently reminds leaders to think back to the company’s value system when 
communicating with their constituents (Tichy & Devanna, 1990).
The measure of a company’s social responsibility is defined by how broadly 
the responsibilities extend—how completely the communication is between staff 
members and leaders, how safe it is to challenge your boss, and the willingness of 
employees to tell how they feel about a particular problem (Hollender, 2004). As 
leaders communicated, they used appropriate change management techniques. These 
included a recognition of (a) the movement of change; (b) the classic unffeezing- 
changing-reffeezing stages described by Lewin and colleagues (Lewin, 1935,1974; 
Lewin, et al., 1960); (c) the forming-storming-norming-performing stages described 
by Blanchard (Bensimon et al., 1989; Blanchard & Bowles, 1990); and (d) other key
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competencies, such as change management skills that include managing resistance 
(Koehle, 2001).
My subjects had an alertness for change fatigue, which is cynicism and burnout 
(Abrahamson, 2000). They recognized that the success of the overall change depended 
on the stability of the business involved and that everyone in the company had a part 
to play in the transformation.
Leaders Maintain Credibility
Each subject had a unique reputation within the organization. Compass had a 
corporate reputation of social responsibility and belief in the individual dignity of each 
person. A corporate reputation is defined as a perpetual representation of a company’s 
past actions and future prospects that describe the firm’s overall appeal to all its key 
constituents when compared to other major rivals (Hemphill, 2004). A corporate 
reputation describes both the rational and emotional attachments that a company 
develops to achieve a net image of itself (Harmon & Jacobs, 1985). The subjects I 
interviewed at Compass described the reputation they were trying to uphold in all their 
dealings with their people. Table 5 briefly summarizes the roles and behaviors 
demonstrated by the leaders in this case, based on my professional experience working 
with each of them.
Thus, Bob, “the enterprise watchdog,” described how he read every single 
reason for dismissal of each person who was downsized, because he felt he owed that
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Table 5




Subjects Played Behaviors Demonstrated
Bob Enterprise • Models ethical behavior
Watchdog • Objectively upholds the interest of the
enterprise by putting aside emotions
Malcolm Technical • Focuses on driving change through
Wizard technology
• Promotes excellence in all efforts
Terry Strategist • Continuously looks beyond the current year
• Uses financial data to predict business
outcomes
Mike Pioneer • Takes calculated risks in order to make a
point
• Looks beyond own area of interest to
propose needed change
Jeremy Trusted • Conveys a simple, vivid picture of success
Confidante • Develops a culture of trust
Zenglo Scout • Relentlessly identifies and secures top talent
• Promotes development of all employees
Melissa Diversity Role • Aligns stakeholders, capabilities and
Model resources
• Empowers others to achieve goals
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to the tenured people. Malcolm, “the technological wizard,” described how he 
continued in order to promote excellence. Terry, “the strategist,” continued to regret 
that he was not more vocal in suggesting that the heads of the various businesses did 
not listen to his concern about new people being hired, in spite of a downward spiral in 
the business. Mike, “the pioneer,” used his ability to think counterintuitively and to be 
known as a person who was willing to be radical and made suggested changes.
Jeremy, “the trusted confidante,” relied on his reputation for people to come to him, 
even in the midst of traumatic business and personal changes. Zenglo, “the scout,” 
continued his worldwide trips to find the best talent for Compass, firmly believing that 
would assist the organization in times of turbulence. And Melissa, “the diversity role 
model,” stayed at Compass longer than she would have otherwise stayed in order to be 
an anchor for other women who felt disenfranchised by the company.
A leader’s reputation is an interesting phenomenon. Each leader must serve as 
a role model and embody or exemplify existing group norms and expectations. During 
turbulence, new roles and new group structures are being formed which require 
initiating new directions for the group’s activities. Thus, leaders must be both 
initiators of new norms and expectations as well as modifiers of old norms (Fiedler, 
1971). This dual role can create conflicts in their minds and in the minds of their 
followers.
In responding to this dilemma, Hollander and Webb (1955) identified an 
intriguing and theoretically important role that a leader must play during these times. 
They point out that the leader must first gain the confidence of group members by
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his/her conformity and achievement. In this manner the leader earns “idiosyncratic 
credits” that allow the individual to depart, occasionally, from group expectations in 
order to play an unexpected role during change that calls for more creativity and new 
methods.
In describing themselves at this point in time, each of the leaders talked about
not wanting to be perceived as being a cookie-cutter leader. Rather, these leaders were
intent upon maintaining their respective reputations, using their strengths to help
others, and ensuring that followers viewed them the way they wanted to be viewed.
They were trying to create a new future for their followers rather than simply being
maintainers of the status quo. These leaders were used to having a vision for their
organization and enacting strategies for that vision.
But, during turbulent times, many circumstances are out of a leader’s control.
Leaders find themselves to be neither controlling nor being controlled. As Drucker
(1995) maintains, this leadership quandary or paradigm will be a constancy of the
corporation. Unfortunately, since the organization had lost so much momentum in the
marketplace, these leaders’ reputations suffered, and they described their capabilities
as a leader dwindling during these difficult times.
Well the first time when you communicate these changes, it’s kind of 
new. But once you get people stabilized, it’s Ok. But when you go 
through another one in 2000, and another one in 2001, and another one 
in 2002, people start to question senior management. “D o they really 
know what they’re doing? Can I believe anything I’m being told?” The 
credibility of the organization (and by extension the leadership) was 
seriously questioned. (Terry)
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Leaders Reaffirm Company Values
Last, leaders in this stage described making significant attempts in all of their 
decisions to reaffirm the company. They knew they had to make decisions about hard 
assets of the company (including payroll costs and capital expenditures), and they 
knew that the impact on people below them would be significant. These leaders had 
obtained their positions partly due to political savvy and relationships and also by 
recognizing the signals in the organization that required success. Up to this point, 
company values and principles had stood the test of time in their careers, and so the 
decisions they made were based on company values and principles, specifically those 
that had been taught by the company’s founding fathers.
At Compass, the company’s founding fathers loomed larger than life. They 
were quoted consistently by my subjects, and the Founder’s philosophies permeated 
the company at every level. As companies grow, the growth is accompanied by a crisis 
of leadership that occurs at each succeeding growth stage (Greiner, 1998). The first 
stage is dominated by the founders and the emphasis is on creating both a product and 
a market. Founders are usually entrepreneurially oriented and devote mental and 
physical energies to growing the company. Informal communication strategies are 
implemented and company leaders are dedicated to affirming the founding father’s 
direction. Thus, the construction of a company story emerges that makes the future 
seem to grow naturally out of the past in terms compatible with the organizational 
culture (Moss-Kanter, 1983).
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In conceiving of a different future, leaders must be historians as well as 
futurists. These incumbent leaders were the linchpins for change. They connected the 
company’s past with the company’s future, something that the now-in-charge 
newcomers could not do. Through reconstructions of the past, the incumbent leaders 
could review issues with their people and help their constituents see future 
possibilities. When the reconstruction is done in a meaningful and authentic way, it 
can make a continued construction of the new foundation possible.
The analogy of people in charge of fighting a wildfire is a useful one here. The 
wisdom of experience among firefighting crews is the maxim, “Never hand over a fire 
in the heat of the day” (Weick, 2000, p. 41). What this maxim means is that when a 
departing crew hands over a fire to an incoming crew, they should do so when it is 
easiest for the incoming crew to understand what is happening and step in and 
continue the strategy used by the departing crew. The easiest transitions normally take 
place at night, when there is typically less wind, higher humidity, and cooler 
temperatures which can stabilize a fire and make it more predictable. By contrast, in 
the heat of the day, the fire is at its most dynamic and most volatile, which makes it 
harder for the incoming crew to catch up to its rapidly changing character (Weick, 
2000).
The leaders at Compass had an understanding of what had happened in the 
past, and what might have been lagging behind, which could cause the new change 
effort to be difficult to properly adjust for a rapidly developing situation. They had a 
habit of considering the events from the light of their own grounds and consequences
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for the events which were based on the company’s founders’ values. They knew that 
every act of business had a social consequence and would arouse public interest 
(Harmon & Jacobs, 1985), and that whatever decisions they made would be 
scrutinized, particularly decisions that were as excruciating as the downsizing of a 
large part of the company’s workforce.
According to Schein, a founder’s beliefs and values are taught to new 
members, and, if validated by success (e.g., organizational survival instead of failure), 
the members of the group undergo cognitive transformation and these beliefs become 
assumptions (Schein, 1983). A dynamic interpretation of that theory is that, in the case 
of Compass, the culture is discussed and socialized with members in very mundane 
terms and in everyday life (Hatch, 1993). Thus, change was described in Compass 
concepts or terms that the employees had heard before, with concepts such as 
empowerment, participative decision making, respect, and loyalty.
Concepts of empowerment and participative decision making are best 
implemented when the organizational structure is decentralized so that decisions can 
be made across levels and divisions. The notion is that when power to make decisions 
is given to all organizational members and the authority to make decisions is dispersed 
throughout the organization, then employees are more productive, more satisfied, and 
more committed to the organization (Arad et al., 1997). Due to financial constraints, 
instead of remaining decentralized, Compass was becoming more and more 
centralized; decisions were largely out of the control of many Compass leaders.
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There was a desire on the part of incumbent Compass leaders to ensure that the
founding fathers’ family values were maintained. Research into how cultures are
maintained reveals that companies with strong founding fathers frequently go to
extraordinary lengths to ensure that the culture is maintained and controlled. Such
actions may lead to what has been labeled as an escalation of commitment (Harris &
Ogbonna, 1999), which refers to the tendency for decision makers to continue courses
of action, even in the light of evidence that suggests that such courses of action may be
failing. Escalation bias is more likely: (a) if  entrepreneurs have founded the company;
and/or (b) when business leaders expect to use their own skills to maintain the culture
or are overconfident (Harris & Ogbonna, 1999).
Apparently, escalation bias was the case for the incumbent Compass leaders
who were desperately determined to affirm company values o f loyalty, dignity, and
respect—at the risk of what a more ruthless business approach would have dictated.
For example, rather than firing a huge number of people in one large downsizing
move, the company leaders decided to go slowly, with the hope that they could keep
as many people as possible.
I think one of the reasons it took us so long to get through it was that 
we were trying to do this quite surgically as opposed to, you know, the 
butchering state of mind. And at the time we probably moved too 
slowly. And so rather than just sort of taking even bigger hits, and 
restructuring too quickly, we thought, “All right, if  we do this we think 
w e ’ll be fine.” W ell, w e did it, and w e weren’t fine. “W ell, i f  w e do this 
we think we’ll be fine.” And so we were dying a death by 1,000 cuts, as 
opposed to sort of an amputation to save the life of the person kind of 
thing. So, I would say in the values system of the company, and 
particularly of the Founding Family, was to keep as many people 
employed as possible so they would tend to go slower than they really 
should have. (Bob)
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We were looking at one business group, and seeing worldwide it had 
over 30,000 employees and was making 1% after tax profit. And we 
understood the line items that go into a P & L [profit and loss 
statement] and how they interrelated to one another. Instead of saying,
“Oh no, you can’t ever lay anybody off because George might not like 
it” because that was the culture at Compass, at least the perceived 
culture—I didn’t say that. I said, “We’ve got to make this business 
successful so that 25,000 people who remain have vibrant careers, and 
who can make money and grow and develop. That means we have 
10,000 people too many, just do the math” And, the head of the 
business said, “Ok, let’s get rid of the 10,000 people in the next few 
months.” And, I said, “It’s not that simple. You have three guys on 
your staff who are fighting like cats and dogs, and they’re all brilliant 
guys-—but two of them gotta go too. You’ve got three guys vying for 
your throne. There should only be one successor.” So we started there, 
and it took longer, but in the end, we did it the right way. (Mike)
These heartfelt attempts on the part of the incumbent leaders underscored how
deeply committed they were to the company they were serving. They tried to maintain
resilience, understand the leadership role they needed to play, and be sensitive to how
the changes were affecting people’s lives.
At this stage, a leader is trying desperately to maintain the status quo. This
stage best signifies what the authors in the literature on change discuss. Leaders try to
communicate the changes effectively and maintain their credibility as leaders.
Phase 3: Disequilibrium
As the decade progressed, turbulence continued. Shareholders were aware of 
every nuance in the market, and the news media reported the earnings and losses of 
companies daily. Wall Street analysts were not happy with Compass, and the CEO 
was under siege. Up to this point, he was known in the business press for discussing
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philosophical concepts such as dignity and leadership rather than for business 
execution or profit improvement. The board of directors, the shareholders, and the 
employees themselves were calling for change.
Change leadership implies that new ways supplant old ways in a bold and 
coherent fait accompli. The implication is that, somehow, you step from the present 
into tomorrow in one move. Organizations are very complex, however, and the 
definition of turbulence for this study was the degree to which change causes an 
ongoing and destabilizing condition in the organization and requires new mindsets for 
the individuals involved. In the case of Compass, the degree of change was significant. 
Leaders were expected to bridge the destabilizing conditions in a demonstrable way 
and thereby establish a foothold for the future. They were expected to reinforce the 
necessity for transformation to their followers and thereby increase support for it 
(Sullivan & Harper, 1997).
New Leaders. Radical Changes
To bring about the required changes, the CEO hired new people into key 
positions. These were people who saw things very differently from the incumbent 
leaders. They regarded the tenured leaders as people who had not positioned the 
company appropriately and who were out of touch with reality. The newly hired 
leaders believed that the required change needed to disrupt the very tenets of the 
company, including the company value system, heretofore, held sacred.
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At the time, the new “Darling of Wall Street” was Jack Welch, because the 
profits he had enjoyed at General Electric (G.E.) were then legendary. My subjects 
believed that because of Compass’s poor performance, the CEO was 
disproportionately influenced by a small cadre of leaders, mostly new hires from G.E. 
Jack Welch had been the CEO of General Electric for 20 years and had increased the 
market capital of his company by more than $450B. Welch had established himself as 
the most admired business leader in the world (Welch, 2001). He also had championed 
initiatives like Six Sigma quality (a TQM approach followed by Compass), 
globalization, and e-commerce strategies (Welch, 2001).
The obvious question was, why had Compass not been able to accomplish the 
same market feats? After all, both companies were supposedly under the same 
environmental and competitive challenges. It was thought that it was simply a matter 
of execution.
Execution, in the minds of the new cadre of leaders, meant running the 
business—not just formulating a vision and leading the work of carrying it out 
(Bossidy & Charan, 2002). Execution included: (a) having robust dialogues about 
people, strategy, and operations, based on intellectual honesty; and (b) taking a 
realistic, rigorous, and demanding look at every aspect of Compass’s business. In 
short, the new leaders wanted to look under every stone that had built the edifice of the 
company, just as incumbent leaders had done during the early years of TQM, when a 
systems-thinking mindset (Senge, 1990) had been initiated.
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The small cadre of leaders who were hired believed firmly in the G.E. model, 
which was dramatically different from the model that Compass had used. The CEO 
assiduously followed many of the precepts of the G.E. model that this small cadre 
would propose. The change was akin to having a new presidential cabinet after the 
alternative party platform is put in place. It was out-with-the-old-and-in-with-the-new.
Restructuring of the Business
In the new order the first, most obvious, and dramatic change was in 
structure—in both the number of businesses that were being managed (regionally and 
globally) as well as significant hierarchical changes. These changes were in line with 
the G.E. model that proposed an organization should be either the number one or the 
number two in a business market, or the business should get out of that particular 
market. This new structure forced some executives to resign, others were asked to 
leave, and some were systematically ignored or disenfranchised. Figure 4 illustrates 
how significant hierarchical changes were being made.
New Approach to Succession Planning
The second, significant part of the G.E. model was the introduction of a stack- 
ranking process for succession planning. It included the determination of which 
leaders were considered the most highly ranked among their peers, based on potential. 
Leaders were categorized into groups based on overall effectiveness. The upper 15%
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were ranked as high potential, the middle 70% were ranked as solidly effective, and 
the bottom 15% were ranked as ineffective and were likely to be dismissed. This new 
system was introduced, not just for the officer level, as had been done in most 
companies at the time, but for the whole organization, including managers and lower- 
level employees.
CEO
less 5Business 3 Business 4Business 2Business 1
X
Legend:
) (  = Leader retired, fired or demoted ™ = Position where new leader resides
O = Leader moved to another business unit ^  = Business eliminated
Figure 4. A Depiction of Structural Changes.
Different Performance Management Methods
The third major change was a performance management m ethodology that 
included a significant shift in how goals were cascaded throughout the company. 
Although performance management techniques had been in place for a long time at 
Compass, the new approach was much more directive and allowed for very little
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variation. Goals were cascaded from the top of the hierarchy to each succeeding level 
below, and employees were measured in a very specific way as to their ability to be 
compliant with the cascaded goals.
Incumbent Leaders React to the Changes
Implicit in all these changes was that the Compass the leaders had known and 
loved no longer existed. Posters, company philosophies, vision and mission 
statements, and, indeed, the very values of the company were now considered outdated 
or impractical for positioning the company for the future.
At this stage, incumbent leaders (a) recognized the shifting alliances and 
values, (b) challenged fellow leaders appropriately, and (c) asserted their own 
relevance.
The literature on change that I examined does not address these particular 
behaviors, except for McCall’s work on executive behaviors that derail leaders later in 
their careers (McCall & Hollenbeck, 2002a; 2002b; McCall, Lombardo, & Morrison, 
1988) But, McCall’s examples were extreme and not pertinent to either the people I 
observed at Compass or the leaders I interviewed. So, I propose my own analysis and 
use other pertinent literature in this section.
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The incumbents became very cognizant of shifting values in the company.
They assessed the value system inherent in the new policies that were proposed, as
well as the value systems of the new leaders themselves, who were now in power. This
small cadre had a low regard for the Compass culture, and for the most part, acted
suspiciously of the incumbents’ abilities. In fact, as new structures were put in place,
incumbent leaders had to reapply for their own positions as if there were external
candidates, to prove that they continued to deserve their leadership roles.
My subjects, who were long-service incumbent leaders, described a
hierarchical structure with the new players acting in a quid-pro-quo arrangement
whereby certain leaders were given access to (and therefore the ability to influence)
the CEO if they conformed to the new model, while others were completely
marginalized and unable to have an impact. One person, who had gained access to the
CEO, was described often by my subjects as having an inordinate amount of influence
in the decision-making process. He was perceived deadly for the organization,
according to one of my subjects, who described him as follows:
I sometimes think of him as Rasputin, or something like the guy behind 
the Czar whispering in the ear of the leader. He would present 
proposals as a fait accompli and we would be totally blind-sided when 
we would come into the meetings afterwards. (Malcolm)
I also believe that, when George led the institution, he surrounded 
himself with people who were there to help him succeed. I think that 
what happened to Brian at the time was he surrounded himself by 
people who wanted his job, and did not necessarily want him to 
succeed. I remember those people who were brought in from the
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outside and my thought was, “they aren’t here to help you, Brian, as 
much as they are here to help themselves.” (Jeremy)
Particularly egregious in the memories of many of this study’s subjects were 
both the new succession management technique of stack-ranking and the performance 
management philosophies. Those interviewed described the changes as shocking, 
obliterating, diminishing, feeling totally vulnerable, tragic, and horrible. The new 
value system that was apparent with the new regime was counter to everything the 
incumbents believed in. The following quotes are a representative sample of the 
militaristic nature of the new world order that the incumbent leaders were 
experiencing.
The role of HR at Compass was to represent the employees and to hold 
people accountable for leading people. And by the time you got into the 
early 2000s it was basically a control organization, split into a 
personnel operation, which was to simply make sure people got paid 
and laid off, and that type of thing, and there ended up to be a kind of a 
development group that was there for only about 1000 people rather 
than about the 100,000 who were still there. (Zenglo)
HR went from being the employee advocate in the 1970s, to the 
business partner in the 1980s, to the organizational change agent in the 
1990s. We were mandated to create a competitive advantage. We were 
asked, “How much value do you create?” I think we went from being 
“social workers” to “business partners” and we had more financial 
accountability. (Jeremy)
And the other thing is you have to get rid of the bottom 25% every 
year. And to me that was very frustrating. People were rating people 
who didn’t know those people at all. And so you were taking someone 
who could have been a very good contributor, and you were just putting 
people together and literally demoralizing them. And to me, the culture 
went from emphasizing what you did well to stressing what you don’t 
do well. And so you went from a motivated workforce to a very de­
motivated workforce. Also from a culture where everyone was 
important, to one where only a few people were important. And that 
was huge. (Melissa)
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Shifting alliances among the new leaders who now were in charge was also
noted by the incumbents. They could see which leaders had been given key positions
in the new structure as well as which leaders had been marginalized by the changes.
The incumbents consistently tried to determine if  they respected the new boss enough
to work for that person and if their value systems were aligned. The incumbent leaders
complained that empowerment, innovation, creativity, and quality had been
systematically stripped out of the organization by the new regime.
I didn’t have respect for my new boss because of his behavior and 
values. He knew that, and now he was my boss. So, at a personal level, 
and at a strategic level, discussions of centralized versus decentralized 
structures, differences in the importance of technology versus 
technology isn’t important at all, very fundamentally we were not on 
the same page. (Malcolm)
The early years were about improving quality, implementing lean 
manufacturing, meeting real customers, and talking to them about what 
was important. By early 2000, it was, “you’re bad, and you won’t 
change—Bang!” (Zenglo)
Long-term service, which had once been viewed as a positive proof of loyalty 
and value, now was viewed as detrimental to growth. Commitment to the local 
community now was replaced with decisions based on where the best tax incentives 
were offered. Innovation, quality, and customer satisfaction—previously considered 
crucial to success—were now regarded as less important than cost containment and 
shareholder satisfaction. Long-term investment decisions that were measured with 
10-year plans were of no use. They were replaced by investment decisions that seemed 
to be based on quarter-to-quarter profitability and margin improvements.
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According to Drucker (1969), the idea of a corporate society is unprecedented
in human history, in its structure, its tensions and problems, and its capacity to
perform. Tensions include the community’s need for continuity and stability versus
the organization’s need to be an innovator, and thus a destabilizer. Tensions also exist
across the many constituencies that the corporation serves—customers, employees,
communities, shareholders, and society at large. For example, the employee’s need for
financial security and personal privacy had to be balanced by the company’s need for
performance and profitability in order to continue to exist in the competitive arena.
The tensions were evident as the leaders I interviewed attested:
The biggest change was what I would call the concept of time. Instead 
of thinking as people did in the ‘70s and ‘80s about decades for 
investment, by the end of the 20th century, we were really talking about 
quarter-to-quarter profitability margin improvements, etc. This meant 
we drove basically tactical decisions rather than strategic. Also, as you 
did that, you really went from an organization that was trying to be 
participative, and basically meant to free people up to participate, back 
to the kind of military organization of “I’m the boss, I will tell you 
what to do, and we need to execute this very, very quickly.” You were 
doing all this in a global organization which is much more difficult than 
you would do in a domestic organization. The last thing is that the 
analysts, the 26-year-old analysts, who gave you your report card in the 
public market place every quarter, seemed to be able to dictate where 
the business was going to go, and what it needed to do, rather than 
having the ultimate shareholder, or the employees or the customers 
dictate direction. (Zenglo)
The shift in values was further driven by competitiveness among individuals, 
something rarely seen before at Compass. Market conditions and downsizing had 
contributed to this phenomenon. Also, the new stack-ranking approach exacerbated 
internal competitiveness, because only a few people were considered to have high 
potential. Notions of loyalty changed. Rather than being loyal to your department or
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functional head, we were told that we each had our “own brand”—that we should each 
keep up our resumes as proof of our mobility and ability. Hearing recommendations 
such as these only emphasized, in the minds of the incumbents, that the new leaders 
did not care about Compass. In the long term the new leaders were more concerned 
about their own careers.
Figure 5 represents the shift in values that was witnessed at Compass. The 
vertical axis represents a style of decision making, and the horizontal axis represents a 
continuum of values (orientation) that emanates from a focus on the community 


























Figure 5. Company Cultures as a Reflection of Values.
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The model is a modification of the work done by Hersey (1977), which he used 
when discussing change readiness. This model emphasizes the shifting cultural values 
that occurred at Compass.
Basic assumptions regarding the organizational commitment to people and the 
demands of the external environment are reflected in each quadrant. I have named 
each quadrant, as if it was a culture, to illustrate the nature of the values that are 
displayed in each culture.
The “comfortable neighborhood” is the name appropriated to illustrate the type 
of culture at Compass until approximately 1998. There was a long-term, strategic 
focus in the company; company values reigned supreme. The company had many 
people-centric practices, a highly decentralized structure, and a growth pattern that 
suggested dramatic change was not necessary. Assumptions that are part of the 
“comfortable neighborhood” include: (a) a focus on quality, customer intimacy, 
societal responsibilities; and (b) a belief that customers, suppliers, and employees will 
also act with integrity and good will.
The “If it ain’t broke culture” is a well-planned, bureaucratic, stable 
organization that also operates in a state of low turbulence. The post office system, 
prior to the emergence of Federal Express (FedEx) is an example of this type of 
culture. As a rule, employees could count on a fixed salary, based on a just wage, from 
one year to another—without fear of lay-offs or changes in structures or revised job 
expectations.
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The “fluid machine culture” operates in a fast-paced, impersonal environment 
where business reigns supreme. Employees may come and go, but the company is so 
efficient that it can maintain itself, without regard for loyalty or the longevity of 
people. Companies in this arena can count on a short-term strategy; they make 
changes quickly based on market conditions. Long-term employment deals or 
sustained developmental programs do not exist.
The “fast break culture” is a super-fluid, extremely adaptable company that can 
run efficiently in changing times. The company structure is analogous to that of a 
basketball team, which can toss the ball from player to player at break-neck speed, if 
required for business purposes. Like a basketball team, there is a sense of the 
importance of each player.
This model illustrates how one company’s culture is diametrically different 
from another’s—particularly if one moves diagonally. For example, the “comfortable 
neighborhood culture” is more significantly different from the “fluid machine culture” 
than when compared to the “fast-break culture.” Company culture is important to 
remember when organizational change agents are trying to help an organization 
succeed with transformation. In the case of Compass, the executives were asked to 
move diagonally, rather than to the adjacent type of organization. Moving diagonally 
caused a dramatic shift in the key principles that were espoused in the company.
Table 6 illustrates how significantly the mindset and orientation of the various 
organizational entities in the model differ. Most of the variables at Compass had 
changed from being those represented in the “comfortable neighborhood”
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Table 6
Variables to Consider in Corporate Transformation
Components
Comfortable
Neighborhood It Ain’t Broke
The Fluid 
Machine
The Fast Break 
Company
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Driven By Processes and 
values
Competition Processes and 
controls








Annual view Quarter by quarter
































































Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
113
organization to the “fluid machine” organization, which was, indeed, a dramatic shift 
for the incumbent leaders.
The model is useful for organizational change consultants who are working 
with the business units on recipes for change. By putting each one of the components 
listed on the left onto a continuum for business decision makers to discuss, the non- 
negotiables for change can be identified. Refer to Appendix D for other components to 
be considered. Unfortunately, at Compass, this particular approach was not 
considered. My interviewees tell the story of how they courageously took a stand, 
based on their belief systems.
Executives Challenge Fellow Leaders Appropriately
Up to this point, my subjects were confident in their abilities to lead Compass 
due to their positions in the company, as well as their longevity. They told stories of 
how they attempted to courageously speak out when they did not believe in the 
direction the new leaders were taking. These interviewees described what the Stanford 
social psychologist Festinger (1957) called the distressing mental state, called 
cognitive dissonance, that arises when people find that their beliefs are inconsistent 
with their actions. Festinger identifies in his subjects a deeply seated need to mitigate 
cognitive dissonance by changing either their actions or their beliefs if they choose to 
stay in a situation that is causing distress.
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The Compass strategy at the time was to go to the deepest level of cultural 
change, which meant that not only did employees have to adjust their processes and 
routines to follow new practices and programs, but also another level of complexity 
was introduced, which was to change the very way people behaved across the board 
(Lawson & Price, 2003). For example, collegial structures were replaced by 
hierarchical ones. Internally focused orientations were replaced with externally 
focused ones. But the problem with static recipes, as opposed to fluid ones, is that they 
then to equate the purposes or goals of an organization with the purposes and goals of 
its individual members. In other words, the organization as a system has a product 
outcome, but the product outcome is not necessarily identical with the purposes of 
individual group members (Katz & Kahn, 1978).
When new leaders come aboard a company, it is easy to focus on the low- 
hanging fruit—selling off a business unit, for instance, or defending the brand with a 
new marketing approach. Making business logic out of a deeper sense of corporate 
responsibility requires courageous leadership (Zadek, 2004), and the incumbent 
Compass leaders had a strong notion of stewardship. They had been at Compass for 
the long haul, and they wanted to see Compass continue to flourish. Stewardship of 
the company required making a profit, certainly, but the organization had a social 
imperative as well—to benefit stockholders and to improve social welfare (Kotchian, 
2000). Stewardship was one of the legacies of the TQM philosophy that had 
permeated Compass: namely, that companies need to focus on products and services
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while at the same time focusing on the quality of society AND taking care of their 
core businesses (Hardjono & Marcel, 2001).
The incumbents tempered their risk-taking with prudence. They used their 
intelligence and knowledge to balance the tendency to take chances. Sternberg and his 
colleagues discuss this balancing as a component of organizational wisdom 
(Sternberg, 1985). The process involves commonplace expressions such as “playing it 
by ear,” “feeling your way around,” or “flying by the seat of your pants” (Sternberg, 
1985; Sternberg et al., 2000). This component of organizational wisdom requires 
judgment, a recognition of limitations and possibilities, and reflection.
When a leader has a high degree of awareness regarding his or her convictions 
and values, the person is much more likely to have the propensity to stick up for what 
he or she believes is worth pursuing (Redmond, Tribbett, & Kasanoff, 2004). The 
question the leader asks is, “To what degree am I willing to stand alone on the 
proverbial limb?”
The subjects I interviewed demonstrated courage in the same ways these 
authors describe. The executives discussed how, behind closed doors, they would try 
and propose a different path, believing that the sudden change in company values was 
not positioning Compass well for the future. They discussed how they challenged 
specific programs that were being cut. These ranged from family-friendly practices to 
developmental programs that were necessary for a wide majority of people, as well as 
programs and practices around outsourcing or cutting specific business units. In every 
case the leaders recognized that by speaking out, in the end they would be labeled as
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being unwilling to change rather than as being concerned for the long-term health of 
Compass.
I literally laid down on the tracks and pointed out the virtues of the 
program, how it had impacted the corporation, and it was one of my 
finer moments in winning the battle, but detrimental towards the war, 
which I was going to lose. I knew the audience pretty well, as I had 
worked together enough years, so I worked the audience, pointing to 
the people who knew would be somewhat sympathetic, even though 
they may have already been pre-programmed to be supportive. And, 
one by one, the ones I brought into the discussion, which fairly quickly 
got to the CEO himself, and the CEO knew that the Founder had built 
the program. The CEO always said he would support engineering and 
technical excellence. So it was defeated. (Malcolm)
I mean they sold off a business for only one billion dollars! I mean to 
me, they gave it away. That ended a 70-year old relationship that was 
done on a handshake. I asked, “What was the value of that? What 
businesses are we really in after all?” (Zenglo)
To be sure, there were those who described how many leaders were afraid of
being laid off if  they did not comply. Some described other fellow leaders as
“hunkering down” (staying hidden as long as possible so as not to cause a stir). One
person described it as being held hostage in her own land; she was expected to be
complicit with the stated direction. She saw many people afraid to do anything
differently. It was described as a brave new world of discomfort.
When John was let go, everyone was floored. He had given everything 
to the company. He had given more than anybody—smart and caring 
and wanting to make the business better. So what does leadership do? 
Everybody runs to their cave and hides, because now the person that 
w e ’ve known as our leader, John, he was walked out! And there are 
rumors. Nobody really knows what happened. People aren’t sure that 
they should hear from him. If you mentioned John’s name, they would 
say, “Oh really? Close the door!” (Melissa)
Before, the organization wanted me to think counterintuitively—to 
challenge the organization respectfully. Now they wanted me to be a
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“yes man”—to agree with whatever was said by the senior folks.
(Mike)
Even my boss wanted me to conform, because by me not conforming, it 
was a reflection on him. “Why do you want to have this radical 
woman?” So at some points in my career, certain traits were rewarded, 
and then others were not. (Melissa)
Leaders Assert Their Own Relevance
My subjects also discussed their efforts during this period to maintain their
positions as important players in the company. In other words, each attempted to assert
his/her relevance as a player who could contribute to the success of the organization.
These were all leaders who had previously run large departments and had made many
decisions on their own throughout their careers. Now they were faced with having to
follow a rigid goal-cascading process, which severely limited their authority. After all,
there was only so much money to be distributed in a setting when cost containment
was paramount, because the analysts were evaluating how Compass was balancing the
books each quarter.
Another phenomenon that was having an effect on the leaders at the time was
the continued stack-ranking process designed to distinguish between the high- and
low-performing leaders. The stakes were high. According to a McKinsey & Company
report (2001), having better talent (emphasis mine) is what separates the winning
companies from the rest. For instance,
A best plant manager grew profits 130% while the lowest performing 
managers achieved no improvement. In an industrial services company, 
the best center managers grew profits 80% while the lowest performers
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
118
achieved no improvement. And a study of portfolio managers in a 
financial services institution showed that the top performers grew 
revenues by nearly 50% while average performers’ portfolios remained 
flat. (p. 1)
Every leader knew how his or her expenditures affected the balance sheet.
Each needed to be extremely cost-conscious when making decisions. Consequently, 
many programs were diminished or eliminated. Internal conflicts abounded regarding 
how money was being distributed, and how certain leaders seemed to hold more 
esteem in the eyes of the CEO than others, which appeared to influence significantly 
how much money they received.
Jealousy reigned. As one subject described, leaders were noticing who 
received attention and notoriety. “They asked, ‘How could the research guys get all 
the glory?’ There was internal conflict about how the engineers could be on a pedestal, 
as opposed to the marketing people, or the sales people, or the manufacturing people.” 
(Malcolm) “It was shocking to watch programs diminish. It was my agenda versus 
your agenda. There were only so many dollars to go around.” (Zenglo)
Incumbent executives felt a tremendous pressure to maintain programs (status 
quo), because these leaders had earned their stripes based on past successes. An 
interesting study on top executives’ commitment to the status quo was conducted by 
Hambrick and colleagues (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993). It used a 
large-scale survey m ethodology, and found that an executive’s tenure in an industry is 
a pronounced determinant of commitment to status quo. According to this line of 
research, executives were more likely to try and prove the relevance of their function 
and to assert their own relevance based on their reputations if they (a) had led a
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department, (b) had built the department, and/or (c) were known in their functional 
field for their accomplishments, both inside and outside their organization. For 
example, the head of a finance organization, who has a large reputation in the finance 
community, would be more likely to assert his/her own relevance. The finance 
executive’s judgment may be clouded; the leader may not see that dramatic change is 
necessary.
My subjects each addressed the dilemma of diminished funds (and in their 
view, a diminishment of their own stature) by increasing their networks with one 
another and with the outside community. They demonstrated what Sternberg defines 
as successful intelligence, that is: modifying oneself to suit the environment 
(adaptation), but also modifying the environment to suit oneself (shaping), and 
sometimes finding a new environment that is a better match to one’s skills, values, or 
desires (selection).
In an effort to draw attention to the good work of their departments, the leaders
at Compass described how they would send out newsletters, hold meetings with their
peers, or have their top people present at conferences. Their assumption was that the
programs and departments that they held dear were not fully understood. By visiting
their colleagues, they could convince them, at least in an ad hoc manner, that the
programs should be sustained. The leaders were not able to establish the importance of
their departments. Each leader, one by one, eventually left Compass.
I was powerless, in terms of being able to sustain the culture, and even 
sustain my own position; yes, this is true. There was a human cry for 
change, and it was from the stockholders who had a lot of money, as 
well as the board who represented the stockholders. The CEO was
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receptive to making radical changes in order to save his job and to right 
the ship and move forward, and those changes were rapidly coming in 
sequence as leaders departed. (Malcolm)
I thought Brian was a nice guy, but a weak CEO. And I thought my 
boss was totally inept at making decisions, even though he was a 
wonderful guy. He had an awfully lot of good things going for him 
personally, but as a leader, he’s a disaster. And I thought, “What the 
hell! You’ve got to be an idiot to stay around in that environment. Now 
lots of people do. They hunker down. They need the money. They need 
whatever it is. But, remember who I am. I’m the guy that’s always said, 
“You’ve got to love me, or you’ve got to hate me, but you’re not going 
to be ambivalent about me.” And I was about to be in a position where 
I couldn’t make any effective change in the corporation, because I 
didn’t respect the leadership and the vision that they propagated.
(Mike)
Incumbent leaders who had fought long and hard up to this point were, in some 
cases, fairly disenfranchised or not included. An example of the “gallows humor” that 
was typical at the time was that long-term employees at all levels would see each other 
in the hall and ask, “Are you new, or are you stupid?” It seemed that the new people, 
those brought in at typically higher levels of management, would last two to three 
years. They would propose many of the same types of programs that had been tried 
earlier and wrap the programs with new language. Then, they would leave before 
seeing if  the programs had had any effect and could be institutionalized.
Phase 4: Disengagement
Like a freight train that has gained speed and has a difficult time slowing 
down, turbulence continued at Compass. Archived documents that I saved from that 
time period told the story of the market at the time. There was evidence of a
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continuing degradation of margins, as prices for commodity products were going 
down. For instance, in 1970, mainframe computers sold for S300K per MIP (a 
measure of a computer’s performance, which means millions of instructions per 
second). By 1990, a personal computer sold for $30 per MIP (World Bank, n.d.).
There was heightened competition because faster adoption rates for new products 
meant a surge in the number of potential customers. According to Morgan Stanley 
Technology Research (n.d.) at the time, it took 38 years after the introduction of the 
radio for that product line to reach 50 million users, whereas it took 13 years for the 
same number of people to purchase a television, and only five years for 50 million 
users to sign up for the Internet. Finally, there were more and more countries that were 
willing to open their markets to private ownership and competition. In fact, the 
deregulation of markets was happening at exponential speed. For example, there were 
only three countries permitting competition technology in 1990. By 1995, there were 
11, and by 1998, there were more than 30 (Kelly, n.d.). Mergers and acquisitions were 
also increasing with a documented 15,585 deals for a total of $365B in capital in 1992; 
19,128 deals for a total of $559B in capital in 1994; and 23,308 deals in 1996 for a 
total of $1,116B in capital (Securities Data Company, n.d.).
All these external changes meant that the Compass businesses had to continue 
to grow to survive. Sometimes that included building alliances, sometimes dangerous 
alliances, with previous competitors. Organic growth, which is growing the 
organization’s core business, often in an iterative way, was no longer enough in the 
eyes of shareholders. Company leaders were required to acquire new businesses,
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merge them into the existing business, and try to integrate the leaders who were 
affected by the changes with a semblance of civility and respect.
Integration was the goal. There was a kind of implicit contract in which the 
leaders were bound together in a mutual and continuing pursuit of a higher purpose. 
Yet, this contract was far from assured when the leaders were competing for one 
another’s positions (Bums, 1992). The tendency to want to dominate and influence 
others, based on one’s own strong convictions, often superseded the goal of playing 
fair.
It became more and more difficult for the incumbent executives at Compass to 
support the changes. They described a progressive process of disengagement and 
disillusionment that they experienced at Compass during their last years with the 
company. Listening to these executives discuss this stage of their careers was 
particularly poignant to me. These were incredible leaders who had achieved both 
financial and personal success at Compass. They had given their hearts, heads, and 
minds to its success. Yet, at this stage of the game, they were disempowered and, in 
some cases, disenfranchised. There were a variety of reasons, but all with the same 
result. Ultimately, each person decided it was time to leave. These were healthy 
decisions, based on each person's own value system and family responsibilities. None 
of these leaders blamed anyone for the demise of his or her career or for the demise of 
Compass. Rather, there was a genuine concern about the new direction that Compass 
had taken, albeit with a belief that they themselves could no longer do anything about 
it.
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During this phase, the interviewees consistently described three behaviors: 
identification of causes for their own discontentment, assessment of the new leaders’ 
capabilities to lead in their absence, and the need to seek new challenges.
Identifying Causes of Discontent
The leaders described how they recognized their discontent in several different 
ways. Three themes emerged: (a) recognition of the huge emotional and physical toll 
that the turbulence had caused, (b) recognition that they had been disempowered to do 
good work, and (c) realization that they could no longer relate to and espouse the 
values that the transforming company now stood for.
Recognition of the Emotional and Physical Toll
Subjects talked about both the physical and emotional toll that the continued
high turbulence had on their lives.
I describe my career as the first 20 years riding strapped to a rocket 
ship, holding on for dear life, and the last seven years was trying to 
repair the rocket while in mid-flight as it pummeled back down towards 
earth. (Jeremy)
I mean, it felt like it was Melissa against the world on certain days. I 
really felt like I had to take charge, because that was my job, and every 
day, I pushed this rock up this hill. I mean, just to really lose a lot of 
steam. (Melissa)
The good news is that, while leadership is fun, it also sucks the life 
right out of you. Because the things that will cause you to lose sleep are
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the people who work for you. It’s not the technical stuff. It’s the 
iterations with your staff, and things like that. (Melissa)
To be honest with you, I haven’t shared this with a lot of people. I saw 
my body telling me I was headed for trouble. All the kinds of things 
that you would check on yourself—blood pressure, cholesterol levels, 
not exercising, and the weight gain—all those things were going the 
wrong, wrong directions. And, within six months of retiring, they were 
back to normal. (Bob)
I think what helped me leave, Tess, is to see the toll it took on so many 
people that were my friends, including my boss, and James, Rudd, and 
Brad. I watched Bob die before he had a chance to enjoy retirement. I 
saw Elizabeth work for the company for 40 years and she died shortly 
after she retired. (Jeremy)
It was the worst year of my life. Those were the longest plane rides 
back on Friday nights in my life saying, “Well, whose careers did I end 
today?” (Jeremy)
It is easy to empathize with the sadness and disappointment the leaders were 
feeling. Jeremy's first quote makes plain the shock that changes occurred so suddenly. 
Melissa describes how she enjoyed working, but at this point she feels badly about the 
people who she had let down due to the continued turmoil. Bob's health was 
compromised because of the stress level. Jeremy's last quote reveals his stress as he 
watched some of his friends die early after retirement and others quit unexpectedly.
Disemnowerment
The second reason for their discontent was that it became more and more 
difficult to do good work with the shrinking resources. The executives expressed that 
they felt disempowered by the new management. All the processes that had been put 
in place had changed many times over because, with changing structures and
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departments, processes and procedures needed to change as well. In addition, roles and
responsibilities of staff members kept changing because of all the headcount
reductions. The strategy of the company continually shifted as well, causing even the
top leaders to have no firm idea of what to do next to support Compass in a
meaningful way.
To me then the game was over, because you couldn’t get enough 
resources to do good work. And the negative was they wouldn’t free 
you up to go get the resources, even though the resources were out 
there. I remember meeting Brian in the airplane hangar and had the 
discussion. And I just said, “No. You know I support you, Brian, but 
it’s just that the environment is such that I don’t think you can sustain 
what I believe needs to be sustained, and it’s time to go. (Zenglo)
I mean, they are not asking us to do anything. I mean, even if you say,
“We gotta cut your resources by half, but we want you to do the 
following” you would organize around that. But it was just, “Cut your 
resources.” “So what do you want done?” “Well, nothing.” “Well, if 
you want nothing done, and then let’s cut by 100%.” As you globalize 
your workforce, how many people tend to stay only when they get a 
player role? (Melissa)
A particularly colorful story was provided by one interviewee. The leader
compared his situation with the Bible story of Joseph and the Coat of Many Colors.
He said that, when his dad left, he could see that his brothers were not going to be held
in line without dad around.
I’ve often reflected upon this in biblical terms. I very much felt like 
Joseph, when his dad gave him the Coat of Many Colors, and he 
enjoyed the good favor of his father. But, his 11 brothers didn’t find 
him to be really that great, and the first chance they got, they tossed 
him down into a hole and eventually sold him off into slavery.. ..I could 
see the handwriting on the wall when Dennis became my boss and the 
new president... There had been a 15% cut in the budget, and, 
previously, I had been given no cuts. The knives were out by now, 
because it was really money from (my brothers) that was going to keep
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me fully funded. And after “my dad” left, my brothers were out to get 
my money. (Malcolm)
As their roles of being contributors diminished, the leaders found their work to 
be more and more tedious. They each, privately, in their own time, decided it was not 
worth the effort any more to stay in the organization. Fortunately, unlike the general 
company population, they also had the financial wherewithal to be able to make the 
decision to leave.
It was as if the “golden handcuffs” had been removed. The golden handcuffs
metaphor was used jokingly at Compass to describe how the leaders were expected to
work like dogs (due to a heart-felt desire to contribute, most assuredly, but also due to
a financial reward system that provided high pay for hard work and results).
The other thing is, if  I look back in almost 21 years, 17-18 of those 
years were fun to get up in the morning and go do good things, and 
then the last few weren’t fun anymore. (Zenglo)
Part of it was financially. I got to do this, got to do that, got to get this, 
and got to get that. So, that’s no doubt a change. But the other thing for 
me is that Compass was such an unbelievable place. And I worked 
there as much out of my heart as I did anything else. I loved the people 
I worked with. I believed so much in the company. And, I don’t know 
that I’ll ever be able to replace that. In fact, for me, I know I can’t.
(Bob)
Incompatible Value Systems
The third reason cited by my subjects, and unanimously agreed upon, was that 
their discontent was around the sudden change in values in the company. They simply 
could not abide by the changes that they were witnessing.
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It was such an ethical company. It was one of the reasons I came. It’s 
the reason I stayed for 27 years. And, when I felt that it might be 
changing, is the reason I left, quite frankly, so I decided to leave earlier 
than I probably would have otherwise. (Malcolm)
I am not sure if  the company ever finished restructuring. And that’s 
because we would say to the SEC we’d have one-time charges. So, 
even if  you wrote off $1, you would say, “Yeah, but without that one­
time charge, we would have recorded a sales increase.” And, it became 
more and more difficult to treat people with constant respect, because 
we did three to four more restructurings and we were constantly taking 
people out. (Terry)
It’s a cumulative effect. I took the removal of all those people very 
personally. I mean people laughed at me, but maybe it was just my 
value set, but I read the justification for the termination of every single 
person who had more than 10 years of service with the company. Every 
single one of them I read. Because I felt I owed that to them. Because 
they had invested 10 years in the company! I knew it was crazy to ask 
the CEO to do that, but someone in senior leadership had to take on that 
responsibility to make sure that people were being treated fairly. So I 
read every single one, and you know, you can imagine, that was 
probably 20,000 cases. So, that’s just how I felt I had to do this job in 
order to live with my own value system and the company’s value 
system. And, when I saw that was ridiculed, I knew I had to leave.
(Bob)
You know, it’s important that this doesn’t sound like sour grapes, 
because I think you have to say you join organizations that have similar 
values, and have a vision that in sync with yours. And as long as you 
can contribute, and you’re in harmony, it works well. When you’re no 
longer in harmony, then either you have to try and change yourself to 
accommodate it, or you leave, or you try and force it back into one 
where you can be a part. (Zenglo)
Assessing Fellow Leaders’ Capabilities
As the new leaders became more entrenched in the organization, the incumbent 
leaders assessed their capabilities, just as the rest of the employee population was
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doing. In many cases, these new leaders had been brought in from the outside in the 
hope that they could instill new thinking and capability into the organization. My 
subjects assessed these new leaders by looking at three different things they did, 
including: how they treated individuals, how they treated their fellow leaders, and how 
they ran their organization. Discussions of their fellow leaders became a we-versus- 
them conversation.
How Individuals Were Treated
Stories around treatment of individuals related to the new value systems that
the leaders brought into the organization. My subjects described how the minority
opinion, once a precious commodity at Compass and highly regarded as a critical
component of success for innovation, had now died. Essentially, they could not abide
by the approach that the new leaders displayed in the treatment of individuals.
I just knew what was happening in the culture that the culture had 
changed to the point where you couldn’t have an opinion. Remember 
how proud we were of the minority opinion at Compass? The minority 
opinion was dead. Not only was it dead, it wasn’t welcome in the room.
And so, you know what, maybe they’re right. Maybe that’s the right 
way to run a company. I don’t think they are, though. You get forced to 
make a decision that says, I’m either going to sign up for this, or I’m 
not going to sign up for this, and the hardest part for me, as you would 
guess, was leaving the people. But I just ultimately said I will be doing 
them more of a disservice if I stay. Because I cannot be effective here 
anymore. (Bob)
Compass is a classic case. People really don’t do things anymore on 
their own because they don’t feel empowered. The consequences are so 
negative for making a mistake that people don’t take any risk. And, so 
you have stifled innovation and creativity. (Zenglo)
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And these are the guys in charge. And everybody else just gets the job 
done. And if you had a good idea, or if you wanted to lead it, there 
wasn’t a forum or a place to be listened to. (Mike)
All those things that happened in the early 90s that really allowed for 
people who were not “the same” as others to be heard, it all changed. It 
was, “These are the guys in charge. You are not counted.” (Melissa)
How Colleagues Were Treated
The new leaders were perceived by the incumbent leaders as not demonstrating
sufficient respect for either the employee population or their fellow leaders. My
subjects maintained a respectful attitude as they discussed the new leadership, because
they did not want to appear angry or defensive about the new people. However, it was
very clear with each subject, that their individual treatment in the presence of these
fellow leaders had not been a motivating or engaging experience.
They cut this nice benefit for the family, and I spoke up that I thought it 
was an important benefit for the family. I was ridiculed for having that 
opinion. And so, that’s an example of how a change in culture 
occurred, and where you go. This is different from what I signed up for, 
in the place I work for. And it’s different enough that I’m not sure I 
want to stay. (Bob)
In the end, I just didn’t have that same level of respect and openness 
with the person that I was working for, and that’s the time when I said,
“Okay, I don’t have the same emotional engagement in my new role as 
I did in my old role, and I never will. And, it’s time to go.” (Malcolm)
I remember the first wave of people who were laid off, They were 
given a tremendous financial plan. I think they were let go with about 
as much dignity as we could do. But, after a while, we got so good at 
laying off people, that I remember sitting at HR meetings where we’d 
say, “Okay, take out another 500.” We knew exactly how to do that.
There was no emotion in that decision. We could execute that in 48 
hours, whereas the first 500 were very difficult to do. To me, it should
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have always been difficult. Not that we wouldn’t do it, we had to do it 
because of the business conditions. But, it should always have been 
difficult. They say, if  you kill enough people, it’d be easier to kill that 
extra one. Because we’re business people! And, by business people we 
meant, you know, profitability kind of at all costs, short-term 
investments, get rid of people, don’t develop them, and stack-rank them 
by people who really don’t know who they are stack-ranking. And, to 
me, that was the biggest crime. (Zenglo)
Perceptions about the New Leaders
The leaders I interviewed did not respect the direction that the new leaders
were taking the business. The incumbent leaders came to see the new leadership as
incapable of leading the organization into the future.
There was lack of consistency in direction. “We’re going to do this.”
“No, we’re going to do this.” I can only compare it to a child who was 
getting different directions from both sets of the mom and the dad.
Where, if  you are the child, you become confused. And you should 
never put the child or the employee in that position. You should have a 
consistent story that goes out and deals with difficulties in a closed- 
door fashion. (Terry)
There was lack of vision. You know, some companies have a 10-year 
plan. And if  you listen to the CEO and the CFO and the CTO, they all 
talk about the next 10 years. The CEO talks in paragraphs, the CFO 
speaks in numbers, and the CTO speaks in technologies. But, if  you 
read the three chapters, they all say the same thing. I think that is 
unique and very exciting to sign up for. And to me, that was the way 
Compass was in the ‘80s and the ‘90s, but not anymore. (Zenglo)
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Four of the seven retired leaders I interviewed ended up finding other jobs, 
either as consultants or with other companies. “The enterprise watchdog” is now 
shepherding another company through corporate change; “the technological wizard” is 
the dean of a highly reputable college; “the scout” is consulting worldwide with 
selected companies; and “the trusted confidante” is teaching new entrepreneurs in a 
business school. The other three are happily engaged in other interests, including 
volunteer work, legacy activities, and hobbies. For example, “the pioneer” is coaching 
high school boys and serving on three boards for nonprofit organizations; “the 
diversity role model” is doing executive coaching for women business leaders; “the 
strategist” is content to do financial planning for friends and relatives. In every case, 
my subjects ended the interviews they way they began, talking about accomplishments 
and challenges that excited their imaginations.
The leaders who chose to find other positions looked specifically for 
companies that they believed in or were in a growth mode. They also looked for 
companies that had the same value system as they had grown up with during their 
tenure at Compass. They also indicated that they continue to work, not because they 
needed to from a financial perspective, but because they want to, based on their own 
sets of priorities.
I think the pendulum is swinging back for some companies to saying,
Look, we’ve got to have a longer-term plan. We have to develop 
people. We have to have some bench strength. You know we can’t 
outsource everything to India and China. I see the company I am
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consulting with emphasizing people development now. I see them 
emphasizing processes for innovation, creativity. I see the company 
actually trying to develop an environment in which risk is accepted.
(Zenglo)
Well, I’m gonna work really hard, and I’m gonna have great times, and 
develop good friends and that kind of stuff. But, I just won’t ever be as 
emotionally invested again.(Bob)
I have proved myself before, so it’s not like I have anything to prove. I 
know I can do this new role. And, I will do it well. (Malcolm)
As they move on to their new lives, all the leaders I interviewed stay quite
informed about the business conditions at Compass. Of course, many of their friends
are still there, as well as some of their financial footing, so it is not surprising that they
would continue to be engaged and interested. What is striking, however, is the total
lack of optimism about the current leadership and the direction the organization is
taking. Each of the leaders commented about the new CEO and the direction he is
taking the company. Each one noted that the pendulum would swing again, this time
against the current organization, just as it did during their tenure against them.
The press is starting to turn on the CEO. He was a fair-haired boy, but 
if you read this week’s edition of Business Week, there is an article 
about him that is beginning to question whether or not he has any 
vision at all. (Zenglo)
The new CEO inherited a really good situation, because, just do the 
math, when you downsize your payroll by more than 40%, you gotta 
good product going there. You’re gonna get this huge positive impact 
to the bottom line. So, all the restructuring and all the work is pretty 
much done, pretty much done. And I worry now about our former 
company, because we loved that place, and I know all o f us had a lot 
of, as much of our hearts as our pocketbooks in it. But, I don’t see a lot 
of innovation coming from the next generation. So, you know, I’m out 
of it now, and I really don’t understand in depth what’s going on, but I 
see a lot of the things that were exactly what got us into trouble in the 
first place. I just hope they don’t go back into the same problems. (Bob)
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Bob is talking about business decisions in this quote, but beneath the surface 
he recognizes that the company is not being led well to position itself into the future. 
Compass was his life's work and in many ways his legacy. He left the company but 
still hoped that it would continue far into the future. From this excerpt it is apparent he 
is not so sure.
Probably one of the things I feel worst about, to this day, was the board 
of directors made a rash decision when they eventually took Brian out 
of his role. And it’s more about timing. If they had done that 18 months 
earlier, we would have all understood because we were in a bad place.
But we knew we had the thing on the right path, and we started having 
record profitability, and it hasn’t stopped since. All those things we 
could see were happening and so, when the decision was made to make 
the move, we just went, “Aw man, not now! This just doesn’t make 
sense because this thing is ready to take off.” And that’s exactly what 
happened. (Bob)
In the excerpt Bob is talking about his loyalty to the CEO. As an upper-echelon
leader he witnessed the level of effort, and indeed the heart, that the CEO had put into
the job. Now not only was Bob disempowered, but even the CEO himself was stripped
of his duties. Bob believed there was injustice in the timing of the decisions based on
the fact that Brian had positioned Compass well for the future at this point.
The interesting part is an anecdotal story I will tell you. I saw Brian 
about three or four months after he had left his role. He grabbed me at a 
going-away party for one of my lead staff members and talked to me 
for half an hour. And the gist of it was apologizing for firing me, and 
telling me that it absolutely was the worst mistake he had made in his 
entire life. I told him I strongly disagreed with that! I jovially told him I 
could think o f  half a dozen things that were worse mistakes than that!
But he was very serious about it. And it was interesting that what he 
had not realized was that I was, and continued to be, a supporter of him 
because of the good things that he did. But Brian is a very honorable, 
good man, and that moves him very high in the ratings, just for that 
very fact. Because there are a very large number of CEOs who, very
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unfortunately, are not, at their core, honorable and good men.
(Malcolm)
The fascinating part of this story was not only that Malcolm was loyal to the 
CEO, but that the CEO was hugely loyal to Malcolm in spite of the earlier parting of 
ways. These were two leaders who fought together on the same team and lost. What 
remained? Loyalty. Although they were not allowed to continue the fight together, 
they cared enough about each other to attend retirement parties, talk about Compass's 
future, and indeed be honest with one another about what had occurred.
The Story Ends
As the story enters its fourth and last phase, incumbent leaders have a belief 
that the organization is on the wrong path. The transformed organization is no longer 
recognizable in their eyes. At this stage they have suffered a considerable loss of 
power. Many of their colleagues have either retired or been asked to leave. Although 
they are still standing at the same place, they realize that the organization has moved 
in another direction—one with which they do not agree.
In the final analysis, each recognizes that there is not much more that can be 
done in the leadership role as it now exists. Given the present hyper-charged political 
environment and the different culture new executives are bringing to the 
transformation, the executives feel powerless to preserve the company they once 
knew. The incumbent leaders experience a complete breach between their value
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systems and those of the current leadership. The incumbents decide to leave on their 
own terms.
At first reading this story describes the unraveling of an organization during 
highly turbulent times. From the perspectives of the leaders who participated in this 
study, Compass, as they knew it, essentially was crushed out of existence. Although 
more or less victims of the turbulent transformation, they did not see themselves as 
defeated. In this respect, their experience could be compared to the caricature of a 
medieval knight, who is noble and courageous, and goes out to slay the dragon, in 
spite of all odds. But, some days the dragon wins! In this case, the marketplace was 
the dragon. It changed to such an extent that, in spite of their most noble efforts, these 
leaders did not win the fight. Faced with increasing uncertainties and a hyper-kinetic, 
politicized environment, these leaders took on the tedious, difficult, and unglamorous 
task of reorienting and trying to change the core of the company, sometimes at their 
own expense.
It is interesting that, in the end, the leaders in my study were satisfied with the 
outcome. They saw themselves as winners in their own right. Although bruised and 
bumped from the fight, they had maintained their integrity and credibility. Based on 
their values, they had done the right thing. Indeed, they had a moral compass that had 
guided them throughout their careers at Compass and informed their decisions during 
the turbulent transformational times.
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The Cycle Continues
The leaders fear that the process will be repeated. They tell of an ongoing 
instability that is occurring, in spite of the new leaders who have been installed, 
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Figure 6. An Ongoing Process of Leaders’ Behavior during Turbulence.
Instability has been noted in all of the organizational change literature and is
becoming part of the fabric of organizational life, particularly due to globalization. I
believe the story of Compass is a universal one. In his book The World is Flat,
Friedman (2005) tells how all corporations around the world have many of the same
opportunities and challenges that the leaders at Compass faced.
We have to do things differently. We are going to have to sort out what 
to keep, what to discard, what to adapt, what to adopt, where to 
redouble our efforts, and where to intensify our focus. This is not just 
an intuition, but the flattening of the world is going to be hugely
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disruptive to both traditional and developed societies. The weak will 
fall farther behind faster. The traditional will feel the force of 
modernization much more profoundly. The new will get turned into old 
quicker. The developed will be challenged by the underdeveloped 
much more profoundly. I worry, because so much political stability is 
built on economic stability, and economic stability is not going to be a 
feature of the flat world, (p. ix)
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS:
A MODEL OF CHANGE LEADERSHIP IN TURBULENT TIMES
Components of Change Leadership
Change is part of the fabric of multinational companies today and the amount 
of upheaval experienced during a corporate transformation is of much significance. 
Shifts in company values and in the distribution of power are commonplace. To what 
extent can change leadership be modeled to provide an account of modern-day 
corporate change? In the literature review it was shown that the literature should be 
more contextualized when studying change leadership. Here a model of change 
leadership is presented which will permit exploration of organizational context. The 
chapter consists of definitions and rationale for the components of the model and also 
arguments for its implementation. As will be seen, the model is built upon the themes 
of the study, after many rounds of coding structures, thematic analysis, and the 
extension of the literature.
In healthy organizations, leaders have a responsibility to make appropriate 
decisions in the best interests of the company. As the study emphasized, the latitude 
leaders take and are authorized to take is observable and noticeable. Latitude fosters a 
belief that the there will be a sense of continuity in the organization and the leaders’
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own careers will not be compromised. It is a sequential phenomenon, because one 
component follows nicely into the other. Especially when there is turbulence, leaders 
are required to model effective behavior. Thus, to justify the definition provided 
earlier, change leadership is the ability to instill in one’s self and one’s followers a 
sense of purpose by placing a premium on latitude, loyalty, and continuity.
Latitude is the capacity to have decision authority that fits with the company 
direction so that decisions are not compromised. The capacity includes having the 
money and resources to make change occur as required. For instance, a leader who has 
latitude can decide, within reason, the number and types of human resources needed; 
the initiatives, programs, products and projects that are required for the department 
under his or her control that are synchronized against the organizational needs; and the 
timing required to complete the work. Although there may be oversight related to the 
allocation of money, the actual distribution and implementation of funds is decided 
upon by the leader.
Loyalty is a rational and emotional commitment that drives discretionary effort 
and intent to stay based on inclusion and values congruence. By having organizational 
values well defined, documented, and acted upon, the organization can thrive, because 
individuals attach meaning to their actions based on the organizational values that are 
espoused.
Continuity is the degree to which an organization can be sustained and 
continue into the future based on its reputation and capability to deliver value. In an 
organization that is doing well, the individuals recruit their friends and families to join
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
140
the company, relate stories related to the company with pride and, in doing so, count 
on the fact that the company will have longevity.
The stages of these components of change follow a process:
Stage 1: Leaders recognize the latitude to contribute
Stage 2: Leaders establish a sense of loyalty
Stage 3: Leaders exhibit continuity for the organization
Figure 7 shows these three stages along with questions leaders ask during each
stage.
Latitude
r Am I heard?
What are the 
operating parameters?
LoyaltyContinuity
For what do we stand? 
Do I agree? i
How do we win? 
Whom do we serve?
Figure 7. Components of Change Leadership.
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During organizational transformation leaders can witness major changes in 
their roles and responsibilities, including changes in business units or functions they 
serve, locations in which they are placed, a fluctuation in the number of direct reports 
they supervise, or even a lower title than was previously held. When the leader’s 
responsibilities and accountabilities are changed to such a degree that the individual 
no longer feels able to make a difference, the leader’s latitude to lead is severely 
hampered. In these situations, an individual recognizes that the knowledge, skills, and 
abilities that he/she can offer (that were previously utilized) are no longer valued or 
having an impact. Conversely, if the leader believes the team can meet their goals and 
feel valued, and the leader has the proper authority, he/she can instill a sense of 
purpose in the followers as well. Latitude is defined as the capacity to have decision 
authority that fits with the company direction so that decisions are not compromised. 
(This and other definitions are provided in Table 1.)
At this stage in the change process, the change leader is focused at the 
departmental level rather than the organizational level and asks: What are the 
operating parameters for me to be effective? And, am I heard? The questions have 
both an interpersonal component as well as an organizational component. The head of 
a finance department, for instance, must fit the overall goal of the organization, and be 
assured that his or her own personal abilities and decision authority fit with the
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company so that the decisions are not compromised. This congruence or its lack 
determines whether or not the change leader can continue to lead effectively.
The term “cultural fit” is appropriate here. Consider the analogy of fitting into 
a shirt. If the shirt fits (in terms of its shape, size, color, texture, and comfort), personal 
satisfaction is enhanced. Likewise, when the conditions of fit, color, texture, etc. are 
not met, satisfaction is less. Possibly the shirt is discarded. “Is the shirt the right size 
for the person?” is not the same as asking, “Is the person the right size for the shirt?”, 
but it is similar. Fit can also be measured at either the organizational or departmental 
level. An individual leader decides if the structure is shaped correctly, that is, whether 
it is decentralized or centralized appropriately to allow room to make decisions. 
Likewise, an analysis can be made whether the organization is sized correctly, that is, 
whether it has the right number of people employed proportionate to the amount of 
work that needs to be accomplished. To take the metaphor further, an analysis can be 
made as to whether the organization is the right color, that is, whether it presents itself 
or its brand to the outside world in such a way that the organization is differentiated. 
The organization can also be assessed based on texture, in other words, whether it has 
the proper amount of interest and complexity of work that contributes toward growth. 
Finally, cultural fit can be measured by the comfort the individual feels with the 
organization, which is the degree to which an organization manages itself and is not 
overly influenced by external forces that may impinge on the decision-making 
authority of the leaders.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
143
Stage 2: Leaders Establish a Sense of Loyalty
Loyalty can be differentiated from engagement. It is a matter of the level of 
commitment that is exhibited during change. Engagement entails a leader’s belief that 
staying with the organization is in his or her own self-interest, and that going above 
and beyond will result will result in additional emotional, financial and/or social gains. 
Loyalty, on the other hand, is the rational and emotional commitment that drives 
discretionary effort and intent-to-stay, based on motivation and values congruence. 
Loyal leaders are called to lead an organization, in both good times and in bad. 
Personal resilience and determination are demanded and the leader must guard against 
despair and show faith in the future.
Loyalty is a combination of two variables. The first is values congruence and 
the second is inclusion. The questions to be asked in this component of the model are: 
For what do we stand? And, do I agree?
Values congruence refers to the extent to which an individual perceives that 
the values of the organization match his/her personal values. The cultural values 
include the company’s reputation and whether current leadership is managing the 
company as the incumbent leader believes it should be managed. Values congruence, 
from an individual perspective, is a reflection of what meaning the individual attaches 
to decisions made by upper management, how the individual reacts emotionally to the 
decisions, and whether a leader believes that the values his/her fellow leaders are in 
sync with one’s own belief system. When leaders can assume that they are in
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alignment with the company values, they can keep running forward, confident in their 
own decision-making ability and influence. They feel relevant, optimistic, and ready 
to stay engaged. They seek challenges within the organization rather than looking for 
challenges outside the organization. In short, they believe that values espoused by the 
organization give them a strong footing from which to make decisions for the future.
Inclusion refers to the extent to which an individual feels his/her input, 
opinion, or presence is sought out, valued and accepted or acted upon by the 
organization. This includes the individual’s contribution in role and the ability for the 
person’s work group to make a contribution to the organization. This individual level 
is at an intrapersonal level, namely, the leader’s questioning of self related to 
capability, reputation, and the ability to attain stated goals. It involves a leader’s 
perception of personal effectiveness and position power.
Stage 3: Leaders Exhibit Continuity for the Organization
When evaluating whether an organization can be sustained and continue into 
the future, the change leader asks: How and when do we serve? Note that these two 
questions refer to the plural we, meaning we as an organization of leaders and 
individual contributors.
The change leader looks at the company reputation when determining how do 
we win. The leader must be keenly aware of the press (including print, audio, and 
visual news media) because the press is a good barometer of reputation and follows
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every step the business community takes. That is because a multinational company, 
such as Compass, leaves a footprint in every country where it exists, making decisions 
about such things as health care costs, employee rights, facility locations, lobbying 
efforts, and social reforms, to name a few. If a company’s reputation deteriorates 
during an executive’s tenure, albeit because of market conditions and other conditions 
over which leader has no direct control, the leader’s reputation deteriorates with the 
company’s.
Change leaders believe they can turn the tide of the business direction over 
time. They stay engaged partly due to that belief. As such, they question each other 
about whether the direction and vision is correct; they argue for certain directions and 
take a stand. They communicate with conviction to their employees on behalf of the 
company. They believe in what is happening at the upper levels o f the company, 
because they have had a voice in making the decisions. They can articulate the vision 
and direction authentically.
The Degeneration of Leadership
What happens when leaders are not provided the components of change 
leadership? A period of degeneration of leadership ensues. Leadership degeneration is 
synchronized with the stages proposed in the change leadership model.
A refined and more complete model of leadership in turbulent times emerges.
It consists of the four phases that executives experience when leading a corporate
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transformation during turbulent times unless the components of change leadership are 
juxtaposed. The lightening bolt (zigzag line) emphasizes major changes that occurred 
during the corporate transformation. The model will be dissected first in terms of the 
phases of turbulence and then in terms of the components of change leadership.
Phase 1: Denial
Figure 8 shows the change leadership model related to latitude, loyalty, and 
continuity already referenced. The circle is shaded to show that latitude diminishes 
during this stage.
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Figure 8. Degeneration of Leadership: Phase 1.
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Denial is characterized by a belief by leaders that the company is well- 
positioned for the future, in spite of external signals that are suggesting differently. 
Leaders, as tough-minded business people, often with huge egos, invest major parts of 
their careers to bring the company to success. The tendency during this phase is to 
show unbridled optimism that competition cannot catch up, that customers will stay 
loyal, and the leaders can do no wrong.
Phase 2: Determination
The second phase, Determination, is triggered by shock as executive leaders 
recognize the enormity of transformation required for the company during turbulence. 
When market conditions continue to deteriorate, leaders begin to believe that urgency 
is required. During this phase leaders try to enlist the support of others (the CEO, their 
colleagues, their constituents) by using their best change leadership techniques. For 
example, they solicit loyalty among followers by talking about the company founder 
and the values associated with the company. They hold others accountable for the 
issues and problems. Balancing the need to keep certain issues and decisions 
confidential—at least for a time—they try to be as transparent as possible about the 
company’s problems when discussing the need for change.
The model, as shown in Figure 9, depicts a shallower step for Determination 
than for the other phases of the model. It emphasizes that typically this phase is indeed 
begun, and leaders cannot rely on tried and true formulas from the past in explaining
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Figure 9. Degeneration of Leadership: Phase 2.
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the changes. Certainly, there is a need to emphasize the values and principles that have 
been a part of the culture in the past in order to help members of the organization 
make sense of the changes. But in the case of many multinational companies, change 
is occurring so fast that the status quo is often a short-lived phenomenon. What occurs 
instead is a very difficult period of disruption that involves disequilibrium, covered in 
the next section.
Phase 3: Disequilibrium
Figure 10 emphasizes that, at this point, both latitude and loyalty are 
compromised. Often, new people who have been installed in the company to make 
differences are provided more latitude to make decisions than the incumbents are 
provided. The level in the organization does not seem to matter. It is often a universal 
phenomenon. You are so-called “knighted” if you are new. The person who has hired 
the new leader wants him or her to succeed. There is much more emphasis on the new 
leaders’ suggestions and ability to make a difference, whereas the incumbent person 
has a more neutral focus. In addition, as the values and principles of the company 
change, the incumbent leaders are often perceived as out of touch with reality if  they 
do not appreciate or agree with the changes.
Loyalty is also compromised. At this stage, the incumbent leaders recognize a 
significant disparity in their ability to make a difference and be included. They note 
that values have shifted and often the new leaders do not appear to have the same
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Figure 10. Degeneration of Leadership: Phase 3.
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values as the incumbent leaders because their set of experiences is so different. The 
metaphor of a ship sailing in turbulent waters is useful. The ship can appear to be 
rudderless because of the lack of company values and principles which leave long- 
service and incumbent leaders to believe the ship is without direction and control.
Phase 4: Disengagement
The next stage is Disengagement. At this stage, rapid changes in power 
orientation and powerful political shifts can occur at the highest levels of leadership. 
Figure 11 represents this stage when latitude, loyalty, and continuity have been 
compromised to such an extent that leaders become disengaged.
If latitude has diminished and leaders are not sure of who to be loyal to, a small 
leadership cadre can take control. As such, incumbent leaders are excluded from 
discussions while programs, projects, and initiatives are dropped or adopted without 
their knowledge or consent.
Continuity is often compromised when incumbent leaders are disenfranchised. 
What happens is that some of the organizational icons or archetypes depart or become 
disengaged. When a critical mass of icons departs, the company loses continuity and 
sustainability.
The components of effective change leadership require organizational 
archetypes to provide continuity in spite of turbulent change. Organizations certainly 
require new people and new ideas in order to flourish, and that often means hiring
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Figure 11. Degeneration of Leadership: Phase 4.
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people from the outside. A very balanced process of building the talents of the 
incumbents and ensuring that their voices are heard is preferable, however, as well as 
learning from the newcomers.
Suggestions for Future Research
The focus of this study was on incumbent leaders who had witnessed turbulent 
changes as the organization went through a corporate transformation. Additional 
research could focus on several areas: First, on new leaders who are brought in from 
other companies and are tasked with transforming existing structures, policies, or 
practices within the company. It would be helpful to know: Were they engaged early 
on and, ultimately, became disengaged? Was their longevity in the company affected 
by the level of the engagement/disengagement they experienced?
Second, it would be helpful to focus on those incumbent leaders who stayed 
within the organization, even if they felt they had been disenfranchised or disempow- 
ered. A useful contribution to the literature would be research on questions related to 
how they were able to maintain credibility, seek commitment from constituents, and 
stay engaged throughout the years.
Third, there is considerable emphasis on generational differences in 
organizational literature that shows the value systems and decisions of different 
generations are quite distant from one another. Because the change literature related to 
leaders is based on the “Baby Boomer Generation,” its relevance could be questioned
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with respect to other generations. It would be useful to know whether or not there are 
specific generational aspects related to engagement during turbulent change. For 
instance, are different behaviors and coping mechanisms observed among a group of 
younger leaders?
Fourth, the change management competencies that are touted in the 
literature—including establishing a vision, articulating the vision to the masses, and 
then executing flawlessly related to the vision—have not been tested widely.
However, new CEOs are constantly being supplanted into organizations due to the 
short-term focus that currently exists in the marketplace. Research on questions related 
to the execution of a strategy as new CEOs are placed into an organization would be 
useful. For instance, a researcher could ask: Do the visions and strategies truly get 
implemented? Or, are they merely accepted and understood at the executive level? In 
other words, is there such a syndrome as “vision fatigue” in the minds of constituents 
during turbulence change?
Fifth, the literature addresses leadership effectiveness related to changing 
power, situations, and required tasks for times when the degree of change is low. What 
the literature does not address are the elements most important when leaders are tasked 
with the tedious, difficult, and unglamorous task of reorienting and trying to change 
the core of the company.
Sixth, the literature addresses transformational leadership styles that are 
appropriate during corporate upheaval. What it does not address are the important 
competencies or leadership styles critical for leaders during the early evolution of a
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new structure or strategy. For instance, what critical competencies are required for 
new leaders in a company who are called to respond to the complexity of situations 
during turbulent times?
Seventh, there needs to be more in-depth qualitative research on upper-echelon 
leaders related to organizational courage. What are the behaviors, motivations, and 
interpersonal issues among leaders caught in internal debates related to shrinking 
resources and changing demands?
Finally, the organizational readiness literature on change management is useful 
when organizations can plan for change and communicate visions and implementation 
plans effectively. Research related to the salient factors that are necessary to ensure 
both long- and short-term success needs to be conducted.
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1. Across your leadership career, how did things change?
2. How would you characterize your organization’s culture prior to the changes? 
Probe: How is it different today? What did the organization expect from your 
leadership?
3. What was happening in the trenches? Probe: What were executives doing then 
that they are not expected to do now?
4. Was there a time when a significant corporate transformation occurred?
5. What were some of the difficult decisions you had to make?
6. Were there some tough conversations you had to have with other executives 
or with your staff? Probe: How did you get others to rally around you?
7. What were the leadership characteristics of the senior leaders that most 
significantly impacted the transformation?
8. How did you develop and change to face the challenges in the organization? 
Probe: Were you a different leader before the transformation than you were 
later?
9. How would you define change leadership? Probe: What role did change 
leadership play in your actions?
10. Complete the sentence, “If I had to do one thing differently, I would . . .
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Fictitious Name Role of Leader in Story
Bob VP of Human Resources
Brian Chief Executive Officer
Dennis Chief Operating Officer
George The Founder
Jeremy VP of Mergers and Acquisitions
John An early contender for the CEO role
Malcolm A leader in technology and research
Melissa VP of Sales
Mike VP of Global HR Region
Terry VP of Finance
Zenglo VP of Talent Management
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Category Definition Subject
Verbal The question I would ask is, “Are you taking charge Terry
ability of change, or is change taking charge of you?: You
required must anticipate what’s coming. You must have the
courage to speak up and ask the hard questions. That 
is change leadership, versus just waiting back for 
someone to be way off on a business decision before 
you challenge them. You need to say, “What if this 
happens? Where would we be at? What could we do 
differently?”
Adaptive Change leadership can be at a macro level, like Mike
process creating your company in a new country, or at a
required micro level, like developing a new program. It
requires change leaders to figure their own quality 
standards. They need to learn to either have a brilliant 
idea for change—it doesn’t matter if it is their own or 
somebody else’s—but they become really early 
adopters of that idea. They see the wisdom of the idea 
and they try to make it happen, even though the rest 
of the world is saying “it’s too hard,” and “it’s too 
difficult,” “it takes away from too many other 
things,” “let’s not do that.”
Change is a Change leadership is to help people get to a place that
mandate they wouldn’t get to on their own. I think that is kind
of part of it. I also think you have to develop your 
own style around that, and you have to accept the fact 
that staying the same is unacceptable—that’s death. 
The longer you stay the same, it’s only a matter of 
time before you start withering away, and so accept 
it—embrace change—and then figure out the way 
that works best for you and don’t hope that problems 
go away. They won’t.
Bob
Change is a To me it means having a vision and creating a 
mindset language that excites people to get there. And you
can give them hope as well as stretch them to getting 
there. And to me, that was always in the back of my 
mind.
Zenglo
(continued on following page)








Change management is very tricky. It requires an 
enormous amount of skill in the front end of 
determining what you want to do, and it requires a 
phenomenal amount of communications ability to 
communicate not only what you want to do, but the 







To me, change leadership is taking your organization 
willingly to some place they’ve never been before. 
Willingly, as opposed to having them kicking and 
screaming. That means they say, “We trust you, but 
we’re going to do this, even though it’s scary, but 
we’re going to go do something we’ve never done 
before.” And the caveat that I would add to that is, 
because we know it’s important to the company, so 







You must remain consistent, but you must also 
change with life’s experiences, and adapt your style. 
Being a better listener and helping people to 
understand that the whole world is changing, and that 
you want to help them understand it, while at the 
same time, you want to show them that you 
understand them.
Melissa
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Category Considerations
Time Perspective • Short-term wins versus long-term investments
• Investments requiring “cooking time” versus
investments that can be measured in the 
shorter term
• Investments that leverage company brand
versus investments that leverage 
departmental brands
Company Orientation Egalitarian versus individualized 
considerations
Valuing unique talent versus valuing 
widespread participation
Family member focus versus business focus
Domestic focus versus global focus
Market focus versus technology focus
Shareholder value versus customer value
Employees valued versus shareholders valued
Decision-making
Approaches
• Level of risk versus level of stability
• Collaborative decision making versus
hierarchical decision making
•  Collective needs met versus specialized needs
met
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